History of Flight
On January 17, 2018, about 1520 Pacific standard time, a Piper PA-32-300 airplane, N4027W, was substantially damaged when it impacted the ground shortly after takeoff from Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO), Reno, Nevada. The private pilot and flight instructor were not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by the private pilot under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the cross-country flight originating at RNO and destined for Hawthorne Industrial Airport (HTH), Hawthorne, Nevada.
According to the flight instructor, who was the pilot-in-command (PIC), he was providing instruction to satisfy a checkout requirement imposed by the pilot's insurance company. Before takeoff, weight and balance computation, visual fuel quantity inspection, oil quantity verification, and a walk-around inspection of control surfaces were accomplished. Both main fuel tanks had been filled to capacity, with residual fuel in the auxiliary tanks. After an uneventful engine start, ground control directed the flight to taxi to runway 16L. The instructor followed the "before takeoff" checklist, performed an engine run-up to 2,000 rpm, leaned the mixture about 50° rich of peak for high field elevation, and observed a drop of about 100 rpm when selecting each magneto. The fuel pressure gauge was normal, and the JP Instruments engine monitor appeared operational. The instructor set 10° of flaps, verified the fuel selector on the left main tank, and turned the auxiliary fuel pump on. The pilot, in the left seat, performed the takeoff and initial climb, which were uneventful until reaching about 300 ft above ground level, when a total loss of engine power occurred. The instructor reported the engine stopped firing rapidly with no pre-indication. The pilot transferred control to the instructor, who declared an emergency to air traffic control and was cleared to land on runway 16R. The instructor initiated a right turn over runway 16R but determined the airplane could not reach the remaining runway and continued the turn. Despite a prior agreement that the instructor would control the airplane in an emergency, the pilot took control after the stall warning light illuminated. The instructor recalled no further details. The pilot lowered the nose and flared over a gravel surface; during touchdown, the airplane impacted the gravel, slid, and came to rest between taxiways "A" and "B."
Personnel Information
The 67-year-old flight instructor held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent second-class medical certificate was issued on July 18, 2016, with the limitation "must wear glasses." He reported 916 hours total flight time, with 38 hours in the accident airplane make and model.
The 44-year-old private pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land rating. His most recent third-class medical certificate was issued on February 27, 2017, without limitations. He reported 110 hours total flight time, with no time in the accident airplane make and model.
Aircraft and Maintenance Information
The airplane was powered by a Lycoming IO-540-K1G5D, a normally-aspirated, direct-drive, air-cooled, 300-horsepower engine. The most recent annual inspection was completed on December 1, 2017, at 5,979 total flight hours. The tachometer read 747.1 hours at that time. The engine had accrued 1,231.6 hours since major overhaul.
The pilot purchased the airplane in December 2017 and planned to fly with his instructor to observe a recently installed engine monitor. An airframe and powerplant mechanic employed by Advanced Aviation Reno, Inc., a maintenance facility partially owned by the pilot, was asked to install a JP Instruments engine monitor. The day before the accident, the company received fittings for the fuel flow sending unit, but they were the incorrect size for the fuel pump inlet line. The mechanic informed his director of maintenance of the error, reinstalled the fuel line with a stubby wrench, and reported that the fuel line had been tightened. He did not re-torque the fitting, as he assumed the installation would be completed before the airplane was returned to service. When the pilot retrieved the airplane, the mechanic was working on another aircraft and assumed the pilot was not going to fly. According to the fitting manufacturer, the line must be torqued between 135 and 90 lb/in. The director of maintenance corroborated the mechanic's statement and added that he did not know the airplane had been returned to service or left the hangar. According to JP Instruments' website, the installation required an FAA Form 337 major alteration, which requires a mechanic with inspection authorization (IA). The mechanic stated that the director of maintenance was the only IA at the time, as the company's other IA had not been to work in at least a month. The pilot stated he did not know if the mechanic knew they planned to fly; he never asked if the airplane was ready to fly.
Post-accident Examination
Following the accident, representatives of the manufacturer examined the airplane under NTSB oversight. Examination of the fuel sump revealed several ounces of 100 low lead aviation gasoline with no water contamination or debris. The fuel selector moved through its detents, and the auxiliary fuel pump motor was audible when engaged. The airplane was moved outside and secured for an engine run with its original propeller. Approximately three gallons of 100 low lead aviation gasoline were added to the left tip tank. The engine started normally and idled at about 1,000 rpm for one minute before testing. The throttle was advanced to three power settings: 1,600 rpm, 1,900 rpm, and 2,600 rpm. The fuel pump was engaged during the first two settings. During the run, an excessive quantity of fuel was expelled from the engine-driven fuel pump hose. The engine achieved a maximum of 2,600 rpm, compared to the published maximum of 2,700 rpm. The engine-driven fuel pump (Lear Romec) was examined and tested by the manufacturer under FAA supervision. Wear was found on the drive shaft and pinion; the drive pinion rotated freely about 40°, whereas a new pump would rotate less than 10°. The unit failed external leakage and seal leakage tests, with the seal behind the drive pinion leaking profusely. While the pump failed two discharge pressure tests, it functioned during each test and failed by a margin of 3%.