History of Flight
On January 30, 2018, about 1345 eastern standard time, a Beech 35-A33 airplane, N9378Y, sustained substantial damage during a forced landing following a total loss of engine power near Helenwood, Tennessee. The private pilot sustained serious injuries, and the passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was registered to the pilot and operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed.
The flight departed Venice, Florida, about 0748, destined for Urbana, Ohio, with a planned intermediate fuel stop. A Garmin GPS unit recovered from the wreckage showed the airplane landed at Barrow County Airport (WDR), Winder, Georgia, at 1146:45, then departed for Urbana at 1205:30. After departure, the airplane proceeded northeast before turning north at a cruising GPS altitude between about 8,291 and 6,558 ft. According to the pilot, prior to departing WDR the airplane was refueled with 70 gallons of fuel. While in level cruise, the engine sputtered, followed by a total loss of power. The pilot reported that engine gauges showed no signs of overheating or mechanical problems. He attempted the emergency restart checklist and broadcast mayday calls on 121.5 MHz without response. He then glided toward the nearest airport but realized the airplane could not reach it, so he conducted an emergency landing on a logging road in mountainous terrain. The last recorded in-flight data point at 1345:22 showed a GPS altitude of 2,418 ft and 74 knots ground speed.
When the airplane failed to arrive, a family member contacted local law enforcement, initiating a search. The FAA issued an alert notice at 2003. Search operations involved the Tennessee Wing of the Civil Air Patrol, Scott County Sheriff's Office, Scott County Rescue Squad, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and local fire departments. An ELT signal on 121.5 MHz was received in the early morning hours of January 31. Due to darkness, the wreckage was not located until about 0956, at which time the passenger was found deceased.
Personnel and Aircraft Information
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. His most recent BasicMed application was on April 27, 2017. According to his logbook, as of January 25, 2018, he had 207.5 hours total flight experience, including 150.6 hours as pilot-in-command and 14.1 hours in the accident airplane.
The airplane, manufactured in 1961, had a total time in service of 3,508.34 flight hours. It was equipped with a 225-horsepower Continental Motors IO-470-J engine that had accumulated 553.86 hours since overhaul. The most recent annual inspection was completed on July 26, 2017, 33.04 hours before the accident. The airplane was not equipped with shoulder harnesses, nor was it required to be.
The optional fuel system had a usable capacity of 63 gallons (70 total), consisting of rubber fuel cells in each wing leading edge (22 gallons usable each) and two auxiliary cells outboard of the wheel wells (9.5 gallons usable each). The fuel selector valve could select OFF, left main, auxiliary, or right main. The auxiliary cells fed simultaneously when selected. The fuel injection system returned about 10 gallons of excess fuel per hour to the tank from which it was drawn, except auxiliary cells returned fuel to the left main cell. The POH recommended using the left main to approximately half full before switching to auxiliary to accommodate returned fuel. Fuel quantity was measured by float sensors; indicators were read via selector switches for main or auxiliary tanks.
Meteorological Information
The closest weather observation station, Scott Municipal Airport, Oneida, Tennessee, about 5 miles northwest, reported at 1353: wind light and variable, visibility 10 statute miles, clear skies, temperature 37°F, dew point 18°F, altimeter 30.40 inHg.
Wreckage and Engine Examination
The accident site was in steep, brush- and rock-covered terrain with sparse trees at elevation about 1,241 ft msl. Initial impact was a broken 25-ft-tall tree. The wreckage traveled northwest about 143 ft before coming to rest upright, left wing low, in a rock-covered gully. All major components were at the main wreckage site. The cockpit exhibited impact damage; the engine, firewall, and instrument panel were displaced aft. The throttle was near full forward, mixture and propeller full forward, electric auxiliary fuel pump switch ON, fuel selector in AUX, and fuel gauge selectors in main LEFT and aux LEFT positions.
The fuel selector valve operated smoothly with detents. About 2 tablespoons of light blue fluid (consistent with 100LL fuel) were drained from the valve sump; it was bright, clean, and negative for water. The right auxiliary and right main fuel tank caps were secure; both right tanks were breached. About 7-10 gallons of fuel were recovered from the right main tank; none from the right auxiliary. Fuel leaked from under the right wing. The left auxiliary and left main tank caps were secure; the left auxiliary tank was intact, the left main tank intact but its fuel pickup separated at the wing root. About 5-7 gallons were recovered from the left main tank; none from the left auxiliary. No fuel was present in the inlet line from the fuel pump or the return line from the firewall fitting. About a teaspoon of fuel was found in the line between the fuel metering unit and manifold valve.
The fuselage had extensive accordion-style crushing near station 151. The right wing remained attached with leading-edge crushing midspan; the left wing remained attached with leading-edge damage at the root and outboard. Flight control continuity was verified from all primary surfaces to the cockpit. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. An engine test-run, after replacing damaged components, started normally, accelerated smoothly, and produced rated horsepower. Magneto drops were within limits.
The propeller remained attached; one blade was bent aft midspan, the other slightly aft. The spinner was dented without rotational scoring.
Survival Aspects
The airplane was equipped with a legacy 121.5-MHz ELT, not a digital 406-MHz unit. Satellite monitoring of 121.5-MHz ELTs ended on February 1, 2009. NOAA and other agencies had advised switching to 406-MHz beacons, but installation was not mandated. The NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-07-51 to the FAA in 2007 and reiterated it in 2013, urging Congress to mandate 406-MHz ELTs. The FAA responded that the cost of equipping the fleet was too burdensome and that voluntary equipage was preferred; the NTSB classified the recommendation as CLOSED—UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.
The POH emergency procedure for loss of engine power included checking fuel pressure, mixture, auxiliary fuel pump, and fuel quantity, and selecting another tank if necessary. The air start procedure specified selecting a main tank nearly full, retarding throttle, full rich mixture, auxiliary fuel pump on until power regained, then advancing throttle.
FAA Advisory Circular 91-65 noted that shoulder harness use could reduce fatalities and serious injuries, but retrofitting was not required.