History of Flight
On July 29, 2018, about 1435 eastern daylight time, an Extra EA300 LC airplane, N32WR, and a Cessna 172 airplane, N6021A, collided inflight over runway 25 at the North Fox Island Airport (6Y3), North Fox Island, Michigan. The Extra EA300 LC was landing and the Cessna 172 was departing. The airline transport pilot and passenger on the Extra EA300 LC were uninjured, and the airline transport pilot and two passengers on the Cessna 172 received minor injuries. The Extra EA300 LC sustained substantial right-wing damage, and the Cessna 172 sustained substantial empennage, left wing, and fuselage damage during the collision and subsequent impact with terrain. The Extra EA300 LC was registered to Captain Property and Investment LLC and was operated by its pilot. The Cessna 172 was registered to and operated by its pilot. Both flights were being conducted as Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flights. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and the flights were not operated on flight plans. The Extra EA300 LC departed from Appleton International Airport, Wisconsin, and was destined for 6Y3. The Cessna 172 was originating from 6Y3 at the time of the accident.
According to the pilot of N32WR, the flight was uneventful until the landing phase. He initiated descent approximately 10 miles from 6Y3 and started self-announcing his intentions in accordance with Advisory Circular 90-66B. No responses or transmissions were heard from other aircraft at 6Y3. Upon reaching pattern altitude of 1,700 ft, the pilot continued the left-hand pattern to final. At approximately 30-40 feet above the surface, he started to round out while slowing to land just beyond the threshold. He advised that no aircraft were visible during final until an estimated 20-30 feet above the landing surface just prior to the threshold, marked by three yellow cones. Out of the pilot's right side, just in front of the right-hand wing, he saw a bright object which turned out to be a departing airplane. The aircraft impacted the other airplane, yawed strongly to the right, and the pilot regained control, stopping about 800 ft beyond the resting place of the other airplane.
The passenger on N32WR stated that the pilot announced on the radio at least four times with the intention of landing and received no response. They saw a different aircraft at the opposite end of the airstrip, and the pilot decided to land. The other aircraft came up under them and was not observed. After stopping, the passenger asked "what just happened" and the pilot responded "we just hit another airplane."
According to the pilot of N6021A, the airplane was flown into 6Y3 for an overnight camping trip. He started engines about 1422 on the south side of the airfield. The airplane was positioned in an open clearing on the south end, and the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) 122.9 MHz was monitored. After preflight checks, the airplane was taxied down the center of the runway. The pilot reported hearing a radio call from Washington Island Airport. A radio call from the 172 announced the airplane's departure in the blind. The planned takeoff was a soft field, minimum run departure with anticipated obstructions, crosswinds, and wind shear at tree top level. No turning circle was present at the departure end. The pilot advised that a soft/short, close to gross weight takeoff was made for a rolling departure with as much runway ahead as possible. No other airplanes were heard or seen. The airplane lifted off into ground effect about 5 to 7 ft above ground level, accelerated to best angle of climb speed plus 10 knots. About 1431, a loud explosion occurred, and the airplane swerved 100° to the right. Full counter control brought the airplane to remain in ground effect. The airplane was right of centerline, and a second explosion and violent stop occurred. During the stopping contact, the airplane was 50° off runway heading, and the left main landing gear dug into soft soil. The left wing remained on the heading and the rest of the airplane rotated to a stop about 30° off runway heading, forcing the left wing into the cabin, trapping the pilot in the right seat. The left-seat passenger assisted the pilot in exiting.
Personnel Information
The pilot of N32WR held an FAA airline transport pilot certificate with multi-engine land rating and commercial pilot privileges in single-engine land airplanes. He also held a flight instructor certificate with single-engine and multi-engine ratings. He held an FAA first class medical certificate dated June 11, 2018, with a limitation that it was not valid for any class after September 30, 2019. Additionally, he held a Statement of Demonstrated Ability for monocular vision.
The pilot of N6021A held an FAA airline transport pilot certificate with multi-engine land rating and commercial pilot privileges in single-engine land airplanes. He also held a flight instructor certificate with single-engine and multi-engine ratings. He held an FAA first class medical certificate dated July 24, 2018, with a limitation to wear corrective lenses.
Aircraft Information
N32WR was a single-engine, two-place, low-wing, fixed tailwheel landing gear, monoplane, designed to be fully aerobatic. It was powered by a 315-horsepower engine driving a three-bladed, constant-speed propeller. The pilot reported an annual inspection on December 7, 2017, and total time at the accident was 217 hours. The fuselage was constructed of a tubular steel frame covered with aluminum and fabric fairings; wings were carbon-fiber reinforced plastic. The ailerons were almost full span with no flaps. The airplane had two tandem cockpits covered with a clear one-piece canopy. The airplane stalls about 55 to 60 kts based on weight.
N6021A was a single-engine, four-place, high-wing, fixed tricycle landing gear, all-metal design airplane. It was powered by a 145-horsepower engine driving a fixed pitch propeller. The pilot reported an annual inspection in January 2018, and total time was 2,800 hours. The airplane had side-by-side seating in front and a rear couch with two seats. Dual flight controls were installed. The checklist for obstacle clearance takeoff indicated best angle of climb speed of 60 mph (about 52 kts).
Meteorological Information
At 1435, the recorded weather at Beaver Island Airport, Michigan, was: wind 230° at 8 kts, variable from 210° to 270°; visibility 10 statute miles; sky condition clear; temperature 25°C; dew point 16°C; altimeter 30.06 inches of mercury.
Wreckage and Impact Information
According to images and statements, after the inflight collision, both airplanes came to rest beyond runway 25's displaced threshold cones. The Extra exhibited right-wing leading-edge damage forward of its outboard aileron hinge, displaced right landing gear, and separations of sections of all three propeller blades. The Cessna exhibited a semicircular impact mark about midspan on its rudder, forward crushing of the rudder, and deformation of the vertical stabilizer. An outboard section of the left elevator trailing edge exhibited forward crushing. The trailing edge of the left wing exhibited a torn opening about midspan near the junction of the flap and aileron. The left wing was rotated clockwise and its inboard leading edge migrated under the forward cabin center top skin. The aft cabin center top skin sections exhibited a separation. Ground scars and liberated airplane parts were located between the displaced threshold and the Cessna.
Additional Information
The accident report from the pilot of N32WR contained recommendations including adherence to CTAF procedures and see-and-avoid. The pilot of N6021A noted that new seat belts and shoulder harnesses allowed for almost no injury despite the violent collision. An excerpt from 14 CFR Part 91.113 stated that vigilance shall be maintained to see and avoid other aircraft. An NTSB Safety Alert encouraged passengers to help look for traffic. The Airplane Flying Handbook noted that 34% of mid-air collisions in the traffic pattern occur on final and another 34% over the runway. Subsequent to the accident, the airport manager and a representative of the Michigan Department of Transportation submitted remarks for the airport master record, including overfly the field before entering traffic pattern, announce all intentions on 122.9, and watch for aircraft taxiing and taking off before landing.
Communications
The CTAF frequency at 6Y3 is not recorded. A witness monitoring the CTAF frequency 122.8 MHz on Beaver Island overheard an aircraft calling intentions to land at 6Y3 and remarked to a customer that the aircraft was making calls on the wrong channel. The witness did not catch the N-number or type of aircraft. The next morning the witness was told about the accident and the time, and he subsequently told coworkers he heard an aircraft calling on the wrong frequency about that time.
Flight Recorders
The Extra's pilot forwarded video files recorded by his passenger. The video showed the airplane aligning with the runway centerline in a right bank turn. The engine cowl blocked the lower third to half of the frame. Minor banking maneuvers were made. About 14 seconds after the start, a drop in RPM was recorded. About 22 seconds, engine RPM increased then decreased at 23.1 seconds. The first sign of the Cessna appeared at 22.6 seconds, with its right wingtip emerging from the right side of the Extra's cowling. The airplanes impacted about 24 seconds after the start; the field of view changed to the Extra's interior, and impact sounds continued until the video ended at 27.8 seconds.
Tests and Research
The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) investigated an inflight collision involving an Extra EA300 and an Xtreme 3000. The BFU's factual report contains graphic depictions of a pilot's area of view restricted below the low-wing airplane's fuselage and wings. A review of a Cessna visibility study for the 172 revealed that forward visibility from the left pilot's seat was about a 54° arc between the cowling and the top of the windshield. Lateral visibility through the front windscreen was about a 137° arc. Vertical visibility through the left door window was about a 55° arc, and across the cabin through the right door window was about a 25° arc. The cabin ceiling restricts overhead visibility. Top, rear visibility is obstructed by the wings and aft cabin ceiling. Visibility directly behind is through two aft cabin side windows, with vertical visibility about a 14° arc.