History of Flight
On June 14, 2019, at approximately 1828 central daylight time, a Piper PA-28-180 airplane, registration N9754J, was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain following a loss of engine power while approaching to land at Huntsville Municipal Airport (UTS) in Huntsville, Texas. The pilot sustained serious injuries, and the passenger was fatally injured. The aircraft was owned by AMWR LLC and operated by the General Chennault Flying Tiger Academy (GCFTA) under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Conroe-North Houston Regional Airport (CXO) in Conroe, Texas, and was en route to UTS with a planned approach to Livingston Municipal Airport (00R).
According to the pilot and confirmed by GPS/ADS-B data, departure from CXO occurred about 1754. The pilot flew to 00R, made a low approach, and then proceeded toward UTS at 2,500 ft mean sea level (msl). The pilot reported switching fuel tanks; approximately 15 minutes later, the engine began to lose power. He stated that he was too low to complete emergency procedures for loss of engine power and attempted to glide to an open field but was unable to reach it. The airplane subsequently struck trees.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 6 nautical miles east-northeast of UTS in heavily wooded area. The first tree strike occurred about 50 ft above ground level. The fuselage came to rest approximately 100 ft and 300° from the initial tree impact. The outboard right wing was found between the initial impact and the fuselage. The left wing and right wing root were next to the fuselage. One half of the stabilator was near the outboard right wing, and the other half near the fuselage. The engine, separated at its mounts, rested at the forward end of the fuselage, remaining partially attached by hoses and control cables.
Examination of the flight controls revealed that the elevator and rudder control systems remained intact from the control yokes aft. The aileron control system had two breaks in the cable leading to the right aileron bellcrank, with signatures consistent with overload failure. The left aileron bellcrank was separated from structure, and its pushrod was broken at the spherical end fitting. No anomalies indicative of preimpact failure or malfunction were observed in the flight control system.
The cockpit examination showed the fuel selector valve positioned forward and down, which corresponds to the "off" position.
Additional Information
The engine was removed and mounted on a surrogate airframe for a test run. It started and warmed up to about 1,500 rpm, then advanced to 2,000 rpm. A magneto check showed no anomalies, and the engine produced power up to 2,200 rpm with the throttle fully advanced.
The accident airplane was equipped with the manufacturer's original fuel selector valve and bezel design, featuring an "X" pattern of detent positions. The lower two detents were both "off" positions, while the forward and aft upper detents selected the right and left tanks, respectively. The valve could be rotated without stops to any position.
The manufacturer subsequently modified the fuel selector design twice. The second-generation design had three positions: off, left, and right. The third-generation design added a spring-loaded stop to prevent inadvertent selection of the off position, requiring the pilot to depress the stop while moving the lever to off.
The manufacturer issued Service Letters and Service Bulletins regarding fuel selector upgrades. SL 588 (1971) offered an optional kit to upgrade from second to third generation; FAA AD 71-21-08 required compliance for second-generation-equipped airplanes but did not mandate upgrades for first-generation airplanes. SL 590 (1972) offered the option for first-generation airplanes to upgrade. SB 840A (2013) recommended installation of third-generation fuel selectors to reduce the possibility of pilot mismanagement; the accident airplane was included in this SB. No FAA AD required upgrade of first-generation design fuel selectors.
A review of the pilot's rental and training history showed that, of his 89.3 hours of experience in PA-28 airplanes, at least 87.4 hours were in airplanes with third-generation fuel selector design. A single 1.9-hour flight, 10 months before the accident, could not be verified for fuel selector type.