History of Flight
On July 24, 2019, about 1420 mountain daylight time, a Beech 95-B55 airplane, registration N8910U, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Chadron, Nebraska. The pilot, pilot-rated-passenger, and a second passenger were fatally injured. The flight was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The airplane departed Fond du Lac County Airport (FLD), Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, for a 640 nautical mile cross-country flight to Chadron Municipal Airport (CDR), Chadron, Nebraska. A witness observed the airplane taxi for takeoff and noted a slight delay due to ground traffic. Flight track data showed the airplane cruising at about 8,000 ft mean sea level, with intermittent radar coverage. The pilot was in contact with air traffic control, reporting 40 nm east of CDR and requesting descent to 6,000 ft. He stated he had the CDR weather and would request the visual approach to runway 21. The pilot reported CDR in sight and canceled the instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. There were no further communications.
A witness near the main terminal at CDR observed the airplane on the left base leg for runway 21. As it made a left turn, the airplane nosed straight down and did not pull up. The wreckage was located just outside the airport property. Another witness 0.24 nm northeast of the accident site heard the airplane’s engine “sputter” as if it lost power, and noted the sound was louder than normal.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was equipped with a fuel system consisting of a 142-gallon (136 usable gallon) noninterconnected design with two inboard main fuel tanks (37 gallons each) and two outboard auxiliary fuel tanks (31 gallons each). Each tank had two independent float-type transmitter units that provided indications to the cockpit fuel quantity gauges. A two-position selector switch allowed the pilot to view either main or auxiliary tank quantities, but not all four simultaneously. The airplane was also equipped with a Shadin fuel flow indicator, a digital fuel management system that did not interface with the fuel quantity indicating system; the pilot had to manually enter initial fuel on board. A review of maintenance records found no logbook entries related to the fuel gauges or transmitters.
A line service employee at FLD stated that on July 22, he serviced the accident airplane, which had a green card requesting that the main and auxiliary fuel tanks be topped off. The employee noted on the fuel card that the auxiliary tanks were already full, indicating the pilot was likely not present.
The pilot had completed a weight-and-balance calculation for the accident flight, listing 259 lbs of cargo in four locations and a takeoff weight of 4,823.98 lbs, with a center of gravity within limits.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The accident site was 0.25 nm north-northeast of runway 21 in a tree line next to a field. The wreckage debris path was on a 270° heading, and the airplane came to rest upright on a 180° heading. Examination revealed the airplane descended into the tree line in a left-wing-low, nose-down attitude. Large pieces of flight control surfaces were found in the trees. The right wing remained partially attached; all fuel tanks were breached. No fuel odor or blighting was present. The left fuel gauge indicated empty; the right gauge indicated slightly above empty. The left fuel selector valve was positioned to the left main tank; the right selector was on the right main tank. About 3 ounces of fuel were drained from the right fuel strainer; the left strainer was impact-damaged. A small amount of fuel was found in fuel manifold valves for each engine. The right engine throttle body screen was free of obstruction; very little fuel was observed. The left engine had about 1-2 ounces in the fuel pump supply line and no fuel in the metering unit. Disassembly of both engines revealed no mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.
The left propeller remained attached; one blade was straight with light scratches, the other bent aft. The right propeller separated; one blade was straight with no rotational impact signatures, the other bent aft.
Examination of the fuel system, quantity transmitters, and fuel bladders found several unclipped fuel cell liner clips. The transmitters were old and likely original; safety wires were inconsistent, with some using incorrect Phillips-head screws. Of 19 transmitter electrical resistance checks, only 3 were within manufacturer's specified design limits.
The cargo from the wreckage was weighed; total cargo weight was about 410 lbs. Recalculated weight and balance remained within the limitations of the flight envelope.
Additional Information
The Shadin fuel flow indicator, when powered on at the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, showed 0.0 for fuel used and remaining. Due to extensive damage, its preaccident condition could not be determined. A Garmin GPS device contained no track data because track recording was turned off.
The pilot's flight planning navigation logs showed he planned to depart with 134 gallons and intended a fuel stop at either Gordon Municipal Airport or CDR. Estimated fuel consumption to CDR was 117 gallons, leaving 17 gallons. Postaccident calculations indicated a minimum of 117 gallons was needed for the VFR flight, plus 13 gallons reserve, totaling 130 gallons.
The Beech 55 annual inspection guide specified checking fuel quantity gauges for proper operation and unusual fluctuations. The Beech maintenance manual recommended fuel quantity transmitters be overhauled or replaced as necessary.
An article in the June 2019 American Bonanza Society Magazine advised pilots to personally fuel their airplane, ensure correct fuel type and quantity, and verify fuel gauge accuracy.
Autopsies showed the cause of death for the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger was multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicology testing did not identify any drugs or tested-for substances.