Summary
On January 27, 2020, at approximately 1524 mountain standard time, a Cirrus SR22T airplane, registration N288WT, was substantially damaged in an accident near Woody Creek, Colorado. The private pilot and a pilot-rated passenger were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
Sequence of Events
According to the pilot, before starting the airplane, he cleaned melting snow off the airframe and preheated the engine. During preflight, he visually inspected the airframe and flight control surfaces for snow and ice contamination and checked the pitot tube to ensure it was unobstructed and properly heated. Airport surveillance video confirmed that the pilot conducted preflight activities consistent with snow removal, including using a broom to remove snow near the static ports.
After checking weather and loading the airplane, the pilot conducted another preflight inspection to confirm no snow or ice remained. After starting the engine, he immediately turned on the pitot heat. Before takeoff, he ensured the entire airframe was covered with TKS deicing fluid.
The pilot began the takeoff roll on runway 33 about 1520. Shortly after takeoff, the indicated airspeed decreased from normal climb speed to less than 20 knots. Immediately thereafter, the primary flight display (PFD) completely lost airspeed indication and displayed red X's, while the backup airspeed indicator became unreliable.
The pilot decided to return to the airport. As he maneuvered, the airspeed indicator became operational again. After confirming speed, he retracted the flaps, activated his flight plan on the avionics, and engaged the autopilot. Shortly after, the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions, the airspeed indicator again failed, and the autopilot disengaged. Realizing he was approaching rising terrain without airspeed indication or visual reference, the pilot activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). Upon activation, the passenger immediately notified air traffic control via radio and requested assistance. After more than 5 hours, a rescue crew arrived on foot. The pilot and passenger safely exited the airplane through their respective cabin doors without further incident or injuries.
Recorded weather observations at the departure airport indicated snow ended at 1449.
Aircraft Systems
Review of recorded flight parameters from the airplane’s recoverable data module (RDM) revealed a decrease in recorded airspeed after takeoff, with airspeed indications returning about a minute later. The data showed the flight director was activated during takeoff and climb before the autopilot was activated. The RDM indicated the autopilot was turned off, then turned back on, and remained activated until CAPS deployment.
The pitot-static system comprised a single heated pitot tube on the left wing and dual static ports in the fuselage. Pitot heat is pilot-controlled via a panel-mounted switch. An alternate static pressure source is available if the primary source becomes blocked. Water traps with drains are installed at each pitot and static line low point to collect moisture and should be drained at annual inspections or when water is suspected.
The pilot operating handbook (POH) stated: If erroneous readings of static source instruments are suspected, the alternate static source valve should be opened. If only the airspeed indicator is erroneous and icing conditions exist, the most probable cause is pitot ice. If pitot heat does not correct the problem, descend to warmer air. For an approach with a blocked pitot tube, use known pitch and power settings and GPS groundspeed.
Whether the pilot or passenger opened the alternate static source following the loss of airspeed information could not be determined.