No fatalities

17 Mar 2020: Cirrus SR22 (N150X) — Conway, SC

Conway, SC, United States

On 17 Mar 2020, a Cirrus SR22 Undesignat (registration N150X) was involved in an aviation accident near Conway, SC. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot’s incorrect use of the autopilot while approaching the initial approach fix and his subsequent improper primary pitch control input while a pitch mode of the autopilot was engaged, which resulted in pitch excursions and subsequent departure from… This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

A Cirrus SR22 was substantially damaged after deploying its CAPS parachute during an instrument approach near Conway, South Carolina. The pilot was uninjured.

History of Flight

On March 17, 2020, about 1550 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, N150X, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Conway, South Carolina. The private pilot was not injured. The airplane was operated as a personal flight under 14 CFR Part 91.

The pilot stated he had owned the airplane for about 2.5 years and was selling it. On the day of the accident, he was delivering it to the new owner for an acceptance flight, departing from Hammond, Louisiana, about 1215 on an instrument flight rules clearance. He proceeded towards Columbus County Municipal Airport (CPC), Whiteville, North Carolina. According to FAA air traffic control information, while en route, the pilot discussed the weather conditions at CPC with the controller and elected to divert to Myrtle Beach International Airport (MYR), Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, which was reporting a higher ceiling. The controller cleared the flight direct to MYR and instructed the pilot to descend and maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl).

At 1540:39, when the flight was north-northwest of MYR flying on a southeasterly heading at 6,370 ft pressure altitude (PA) and descending about 500 ft-per-minute (fpm), the controller cleared the flight to UXDEP, the initial approach fix for the instrument landing system (ILS) or localizer runway 18 approach at MYR. The pilot entered the UXDEP waypoint into the GPS. The airplane turned to a southerly heading towards UXDEP and continued to descend about 500 fpm.

The pilot reported that the airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions and that he flew towards UXDEP with the autopilot possibly in “NAV” mode. Recorded data from the airplane’s cockpit displays confirmed the autopilot was in “NAV” mode. As the flight continued towards UXDEP, the airplane was not descending as fast as the pilot wanted, and the airplane “was not as stable as he wanted [it] to be.”

The downloaded data indicated that at 1544:07, autopilot course capture occurred. About 7 seconds later, the airplane was about 4,500 ft PA and 8 nautical miles northwest of UXDEP, when the controller instructed the pilot to cross UXDEP at or above 2,000 ft msl and cleared the flight for the ILS runway 18 approach.

The flight continued towards UXDEP and descended until about 1546 when it leveled off about 3,000 ft PA. At 1547:15, when the flight was about 1.4 nautical miles north-northwest of UXDEP on a south-southeasterly heading at about 3,000 ft PA, autopilot course capture occurred again, followed 1 second later by a turn to the left. It could not be determined from the available evidence what autopilot course was selected; the recorded data showed that the approach mode of the autopilot was never engaged and that autopilot failure did not occur.

At 1547:20, with the autopilot altitude bug set at 2,000 ft msl, the autopilot vertical speed mode engaged, and the autopilot vertical speed bug set to 500 fpm descent, the airplane climbed less than 10 ft over 4 seconds then began slowly descending with the altitude rate decreasing to -1,000 feet-per-minute, and pitch trim-in-motion occurring several times until 1547:45. About this time, the flight was near UXDEP and crossed the center of the localizer course heading in an east-southeasterly direction, and the waypoint changed from UXDEP to KCPC.

Between 1547:45 and 1547:59, with the autopilot vertical speed mode engaged, multiple short duration pitch trim-in-motion engagements occurred, resulting in the airplane climbing. At 1547:59, as the flight passed outside the outer edge of the localizer, the autopilot turned off. The pilot could not recall turning the autopilot off, and the reason for the autopilot turning off could not be determined from the available evidence.

Beginning at 1548:00 and lasting about 1 minute, a series of altitude excursions occurred during which the airplane repeatedly climbed and descended. At 1548:04, the controller advised the pilot he was going through the localizer, and 11 seconds later the pilot advised he was aborting the procedure and would “climb out.”

The pilot reported that he added power to maintain altitude or climb and intended to “re-shoot the approach.” When he added power, it felt “like it was harder and harder to keep the instruments centered,” “like it was less stable than more,” and “like he was fighting it.” He saw chevrons on the primary flight display (indicating pitch greater than +50° or less than -30°) and decided to deploy the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS).

At 1549:01, the airplane was in about a -42° nose-down and 13° left-roll attitude, which the pilot described as an unusual attitude, when the CAPS was deployed. The pilot informed the controller of the CAPS deployment, and while descending under canopy, he cracked open both doors, secured the engine, and prepared for touchdown, which occurred on all three landing gear. During landing, the nose landing gear collapsed and the rudder partially separated.

Aircraft Information

The airplane was equipped with a Genesys-Aerosystems (formerly S-TEC) Fifty Five X autopilot system, an Avidyne PFD, and an Avidyne multi-function display (MFD). According to the autopilot Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH), when the remote autopilot on switch has been selected and both a roll mode and a pitch mode engaged, the autopilot will provide an annunciation whenever it is automatically trimming the airplane. The POH also indicated that should the pitch servo loading exceed a preset threshold for 3 seconds (such as a pilot input), the autopilot will annunciate “TRIM” followed by an up or down symbol. If the autopilot is still trimming after 4 more seconds, the annunciation will flash. Once the aircraft is sufficiently trimmed, the annunciation extinguishes. The handbook included a check of the autotrim system as part of the preflight check.

Wreckage and Impact Information

A picture of the cockpit taken by a first responder depicted the roll trim indicator in a right roll condition, and a picture of the pitch trim actuator taken by the recovery crew depicted the pitch trim in a near full nose-down condition. The PFD and memory card from the MFD were sent to the manufacturer for data read-out. The data was provided to the NTSB's Vehicle Recorder Division and served as the source for the Cockpit Displays – Recorded Flight Data report.

The wing was removed from the airframe, and the airplane was shipped to the manufacturer for a repair estimate. Genesys-AeroSystems autopilot components (turn coordinator, pitch servo, autopilot processor/computer, and altitude transducer) and the Globe Motors autopilot roll servo motor were removed and shipped to the manufacturer for testing by the NTSB.

The turn coordinator passed all acceptance test procedure (ATP) tests except test point 2.6(a), which checked across the gyro signal and reference signal when level for centering. For ATP testing of the pitch servo, cut electrical wires were spliced. At initial startup, motor voltage was 4 volts, greater than the cutoff value of 2 volts. A manufacturer representative reported that this would cause a small delay in servo reaction, potentially causing small pitch oscillations of about 1° to 2°, which would present no flight hazard. The pitch servo passed all subsequent test points. The autopilot processor/computer and altitude transducer passed all ATP tests; the processor back lighting was dim. The roll servo motor passed its ATP tests.

Contributing factors

Incorrect use/operationPilot