No fatalities

19 Sep 2020: Piper PA31 350 (N257SH) — Island Air Charter — Fort Lauderdale, FL

Fort Lauderdale, FL, United States
SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On September 19, 2020, a Piper PA-31-350 made a forced landing at Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport after both engines lost power. The pilot and seven passengers were uninjured. The airplane sustained substantial damage.

History of Flight

On September 19, 2020, about 1142 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-31-350, registration N257SH, operated by Island Air Charters as a Part 135 scheduled passenger flight, experienced a dual engine power loss during approach to Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE). The pilot and seven passengers were not injured. The airplane had departed from Grand Bahama International Airport (FPO) at about 1120.

Approximately 10 to 15 miles offshore over the Atlantic Ocean, the left engine stopped producing power. The pilot opened the fuel cross-feed valve, switched on both fuel boost pumps, and restored left engine power. Upon reaching land, he considered landing at Pompano Beach Airpark but continued to FXE, about 6 miles away, based on the right engine fuel gauge indicating sufficient fuel.

When turning onto left base for runway 13, both engines lost power. The airplane was too low and slow to reach the runway, so the pilot executed a forced landing on the grass between the runway and taxiway B. Surveillance video showed the airplane hit two taxiway signs, spun 90 degrees, and came to a stop. The nose gear collapsed, the fuselage sustained substantial damage, and the left main gear and propeller blades were also damaged.

Fuel and Preflight Actions

The airplane was last refueled on September 16, 2020, three days before the accident. The pilot requested only the inboard tanks (56 gallons each) be topped off, totaling 112 gallons; outboard tanks remained empty due to weight and balance restrictions. He flew a round trip from FXE to FPO, logged as 1 hour. He did not visually check fuel levels before the accident flight. The pilot assumed 2 hours of fuel onboard, sufficient for the round trip plus 30-minute reserve. He stated he could not visually check fuel level due to wing design.

Fuel gauges indicated both inboard tanks more than half full before departure, with the left gauge reading lower than the right. The pilot relied on fuel burn calculations: 40 gph for the first hour, then 34-36 gph, but later noted the burn should have been 50 gph with stops.

Aircraft Information

The Piper PA-31-350 (Chieftain) was a twin-engine airplane powered by two Lycoming TIO-540-J2BD engines. It had two pilot seats and eight passenger seats. Fuel system comprised four bladder tanks: main inboard (56 gal each) and auxiliary outboard (40 gal each), total 192 gallons (182 useable). The Pilot Operating Handbook required checking fuel quantity gauges and visually verifying fuel supply.

Post-Accident Examination

Examination showed all four fuel tanks intact and undamaged. No fuel stains or leaks were found. Draining revealed: left wing fuel filter yielded about ½ ounce fuel and 2 ounces water; no fuel from left inboard/outboard; right wing filter yielded 6 ounces fuel; right inboard yielded 12 ounces fuel; none from right outboard. After adding 10 gallons to each tank and pressurizing for 30 minutes, no leaks were observed. Fuel gauges indicated about 10 gallons in each inboard tank. No mechanical discrepancies were found.

Personnel and Medical Information

The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate and flight instructor ratings. He reported 19,234 total flight hours, 3,000 in type. He also served as director of operations and general manager of Island Air Charters.

Passengers noted the pilot’s hands shaking before and after the accident. Medical records showed treatment for long-standing tremor, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol. The FAA had authorized special issuance medical certification for tremor in October 2019. His last medical examination in July 2020 should have addressed these conditions but did not; the AME issued a first-class certificate. Medications included propranolol, atorvastatin, and aspirin. The pilot reported nightly alcohol consumption but allowed over 8 hours before flying. Postaccident drug/alcohol testing was not conducted; the company’s manual addressed testing procedures, but the chief pilot, who was out of state, did not inquire about testing.

Contributing factors

PilotFluid level