2 fatalities

2 Oct 2020: SOCATA TBM700 (N965DM) — Corfu, NY

Corfu, NY, United States

On 2 Oct 2020, a SOCATA TBM700 (registration N965DM) was involved in an aviation accident near Corfu, NY. 2 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot’s failure to maintain control of the airplane for undetermined reasons during the descent to the destination airport. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 9 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On October 2, 2020, a Socata TBM 700 (N965DM) crashed near Corfu, New York, killing the pilot and passenger. The aircraft, on a Part 91 personal flight, descended from FL280 and entered a spiral dive. Investigators found no explicit cause.

History of Flight

On October 2, 2020, at 1144 eastern daylight time, a Socata TBM 700, registration N965DM, was destroyed in an accident near Corfu, New York. The private pilot and one passenger sustained fatal injuries. The flight was conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight.

The airplane was serviced with 173 gallons of Jet A fuel on the morning of the accident, filling the tanks. The first flight departed Buffalo Niagara International Airport (BUF) at 0747 and landed at Manchester Airport (MHT) at 0914, where the passenger boarded. No services were received before the departure for the accident flight.

Radar data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) showed departure at 1019 and a climb to flight level (FL) 280, where it remained in level flight. Air traffic control voice communications revealed the pilot checked in with Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center after a frequency change. About 25 minutes elapsed before the pilot contacted Buffalo Approach Control when approximately 30 miles east of BUF.

On initial contact, the pilot reported losing communication with center and being level at FL280. At about 1141, the controller instructed a descent to 8,000 feet and to expect the ILS runway 23 approach. Radar data showed the descent began around this time. The controller asked if everything was okay; the pilot responded, “yes sir, everything’s fine.” The controller then cleared the pilot to fly direct to BUF and expect vectors for a left downwind to the ILS. The pilot acknowledged.

About two minutes later, the controller asked the pilot where he was headed; the pilot gave a garbled response. The controller instructed the pilot to stop descent and maintain 10,000 feet, then any altitude. No further response was received despite multiple attempts.

Witnesses near the crash site reported the engine sound was “very loud” before the sound of impact.

Personnel Information

The pilot reported 60 flight hours in the six months before his last FAA medical examination. His logbook showed a flight on May 20, 2019, and completion of a SimCom recurrent course for the TBM850 on February 9, 2020. A logbook summary indicated flight hours over the four years prior to the accident: 100.2 total (90.1 TBM) in 2016; 53.9 total (53.9 TBM) in 2017; 70.1 total (70.1 TBM) in 2018; 25.1 total (25.1 TBM) in 2019.

Aircraft Information

FAA records indicated the pilot purchased the airplane in June 2016. It was powered by a Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-66D, 850-horsepower engine with a Hartzell constant-speed propeller. According to the airplane flight manual, the airplane had an altimetric valve that automatically actuated passenger oxygen masks at a cabin altitude between 13,000 and 14,000 feet when the oxygen switch was set to ON.

Meteorological Information

The 1154 weather observation at BUF (about 17 miles west of the accident site) included wind from 250° at 9 knots, visibility 10 miles, few clouds at 2,000 feet agl and 3,500 feet agl, broken layers at 6,000 and 14,000 feet agl, temperature 13°C, dew point 8°C, and altimeter 29.97 inHg. High-resolution rapid refresh model soundings for the accident site around 1200 indicated wind at FL190 from the west about 25 knots, relative humidity at FL190 of 33%, and relative humidity above 90% above about 9,000 feet. The freezing level was about 5,200 feet. Calculations by the Rawinsonde Observation Program did not identify potential for icing, clouds, or significant turbulence between about 9,000 and 27,000 feet.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The airplane impacted a heavily wooded, swampy area, fragmenting and suffering postcrash fire. Wreckage components were buried 15 feet below the surface. All major components were accounted for. First responders noted an odor of Jet A fuel.

The fuselage was fragmented by impact. The main cabin door locking pins were extended and the handle was closed. A passenger emergency oxygen mask was found separated from the airframe but remained inside its housing. Control cable continuity could not be confirmed due to fragmentation; all cables and push-pull tubes exhibited tensile overload fractures. The autopilot aileron and trip servos were located with cables showing tensile overload failures. Most primary and secondary flight control surfaces were in the fragmented wreckage.

Both forward and aft sections of the center wing spar were bent symmetrically about 43° aft. The left elevator trim tab was separated into four sections; the right elevator trim tab's inboard section remained attached. Elevator trim actuators measured 16mm, consistent with neutral position. The rudder was impact-separated from the vertical stabilizer; the top section and rudder trim tab were not located. The tailcone was impact-separated.

Engine examination revealed the accessory gearbox and inlet case were impact-separated and not located. Multiple parts of the power turbine and compressor sections exhibited rotational scoring. Multiple blades were fractured, smeared, and bent opposite the direction of travel. Fracture surfaces not smeared were consistent with overload.

The propeller hub was impact-separated from the engine; all five blades were impact-separated from the hub. Portions of each blade were found in the wreckage.

Additional Information

A performance study using airplane weight, radar, communications, and weather data showed the airplane was in cruise at 28,000 feet and about 190 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS) until 1141:17. Over 30 seconds, the nose pitched down about 10° and the rate of descent increased to 4,500 feet per minute. The descent began 15 seconds after the clearance. The airplane maintained heading until 1143:31, when it descended through 19,300 feet and accelerated through its maximum operating speed of 271 KCAS.

The study indicated the airplane then entered a right banking turn reaching nearly 90° with a pitch-down attitude of 47°. Airspeed and rate of descent increased; airspeed reached 350 KCAS, and the rate of descent peaked at 28,400 feet per minute at 1144:13, then decreased to 6,800 feet per minute at the end of data. Computed normal load factor increased to about 3.8 G. The descent profile was consistent with a spiral dive.

According to the manufacturer, the autopilot engagement limitation for angle of bank was ±45° and -15° for descending pitch angle. The autopilot operational envelope limited bank to ±25° and descending pitch to -10°. The airplane was equipped with an emergency descent mode that, when engaged, signaled the autopilot to initiate a 90° left turn and descent up to 4,000 feet per minute to a target altitude of 15,000 feet msl.

Medical and Pathological Information

An autopsy by the Monroe County Office of the Medical Examiner determined the pilot’s cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries, manner of death accident. The examination was limited by extensive injuries. Toxicology testing by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory detected ethanol in the pilot’s muscle tissue at 0.022 grams per hectogram (gm/hg). No other tested drugs were detected. Toxicology testing by the medical examiner’s office was negative for ethanol and tested drugs. Ethanol can be produced after death by microbial activity, especially with extensive trauma.

Probable Cause

The investigation did not state a probable cause.

Contributing factors

Pilot