History of Flight
On February 13, 2021, about 1150 Pacific daylight time, a Dassault Falcon 900EX EASy, N823RC, was substantially damaged during a rejected takeoff from runway 28R at Montgomery-Gibbs Executive Airport (MYF), San Diego, California. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The two pilots, flight attendant, and two passengers were not injured.
According to the flight crew, this was their third flight in the airplane. The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and the first officer was the pilot monitoring (PM). Preflight checks, engine start, taxi, and engine run-ups were normal. The crew discussed fuel: “19.5 required,” burning “11.5,” with an extra “6 to 7 onboard.” During the after-start/before-taxi checklist, the crew discussed trim settings, noting “we’re pretty far aft,” and acknowledged airspeeds as “green, 112.” They reviewed their departure plan and intended not to reject the takeoff after reaching 80 knots.
Takeoff began at 1146:13. The crew called V1, and at 1146:52, the first officer called “rotate.” Seven seconds later, the captain responded that they “couldn’t take off.” The first officer called for “thrust reversers,” and the captain stated “he couldn’t,” followed by repeated “we can’t” exclamations. Sounds of the airplane departing the paved surface were recorded, along with master caution alerts. The captain said “kill it” before the recording ended.
The airplane overran the departure end of the runway by about 315 feet and struck a berm, shearing off all three landing gear. It slid an additional 230 feet and came to rest on a gravel overrun pad. The wings and fuselage sustained substantial damage; fuel tanks ruptured but no fire ensued.
Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) did not travel to the accident site. Data were gathered by representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Dassault Aviation.
Personnel Information
The captain was employed by the airplane’s owner and had previously flown another aircraft for the same owner. He held multiple type ratings in corporate jets. When asked for his pilot certificate at the scene, he could not initially locate it, but produced it later. The accident airplane type rating was not listed in his certificates. FAA records showed an emergency revocation of all his certificates on February 13, 2019, for violating 14 CFR §61.59(a)(2) by falsifying logbook entries and records for pilot proficiency checks, competency checks, and training events on 15 occasions while employed as a check pilot for a Part 135 operator. The captain used his tablet with Aircraft Performance Group software to calculate performance and file the flight plan; he reported the tablet was destroyed and could not recall weight and balance or performance data. He was enrolled in DA-900EX EASy initial training on October 1, 2020, but never finished ground or flight simulator training and was not issued a type rating.
The first officer was also employed by the owner, initially as a helicopter pilot and security specialist. At the time of the accident, he reported 568 total flight hours, including 380 in helicopters. He was enrolled in DA-900EX EASy initial training on August 31, 2020, and received his type rating with pilot-in-command limitations on his second checkride attempt on September 28, 2020. He had logged 16 hours in the Falcon 900EX EASy. He confirmed FMS inputs made by the captain but later stated he was not proficient with the FMS.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was manufactured in 2008 and had its most recent annual inspection on June 18, 2020, at 2,977 total hours. A Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for winglets was installed, which affected weight, balance, and trim settings per an AFM Supplement. Honeywell reviewed the central maintenance computer and found no anomalies with engines or airplane systems. Review of the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) and maintenance data recorder (MDR) revealed no mechanical anomalies.
The airplane was equipped with an FMS interfaced with ACARS. Collins Aerospace reported that TOLD data transmissions were available but not used on the accident day. The same city pairing (KMYF–PHKO) had been entered into the FMS days earlier. A paper copy of a TOLD card was not recovered; performance data could not be retrieved from the FMS due to fuel spill.
With the airplane configured at slats/flaps 20° (SF2) and an available takeoff run of 4,598 feet, the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) limit was 45,064 lbs. Based on DFDR and pilot data, 20,500 lbs of fuel was onboard, resulting in an actual takeoff weight of 48,039 lbs. The balance field length required at that weight was 5,173 feet. The forward center of gravity (CG) limit per the STC AFM was 15% for takeoff with SF2; the calculated CG was 15.2%.
The STC AFM supplement recommended a pitch trim position of -7.5° for a heavy gross weight takeoff with a forward CG. The DFDR showed stabilizer trim set at -5.73°, with SF2 selected. The airplane manufacturer stated that if MTOW is exceeded, an amber “FIELD LIMITED” message would appear on the FMS TOLD page, and it would not compute takeoff speeds; consequently, no takeoff card would be displayed and correct airspeed bugs (V1, Vr) would not appear. Pilots could manually change FMS-suggested runway length or takeoff weight.
DFDR data indicated the captain attempted rotation at 110 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). At MTOW, Vr was calculated as 133 KIAS. The rejected takeoff was initiated at 123 KIAS, with a maximum speed of 127 KIAS. After decelerating to 102 KIAS and traveling 3,770 feet down the runway, thrust reversers were fully deployed. The airplane exited the runway at 75 KIAS and struck a berm at 59 KIAS. The CVR, DFDR, and MDR showed engines, flight controls, and brakes were functioning.
Additional Information
The Crew Operational Documentation for Dassault EASy aircraft (CODDE2) directs pilots to set the trim indicator in the green band for takeoff. It notes that the appropriate position within the green band depends on CG location: nose-up if balanced towards forward limits, nose-down if balanced aft. A second note states that during takeoff with heavy gross weight and forward CG, if not trimmed toward the nose-up limit of the green band, rotation may require full aft control yoke with a possible delay.
According to the FAA’s Aircraft Weight and Balance Handbook, loading in a nose-heavy condition causes problems in controlling and raising the nose, especially during takeoff and landing.