History of Flight
On November 3, 2022, about 1915 mountain standard time, an Eclipse Aerospace EA500, registration N150NE, was substantially damaged during a landing accident at Falcon Field Airport (KFFZ) in Mesa, Arizona. The flight was a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations part 91 post-maintenance positioning flight. Both the pilot and co-pilot were not injured.
The airplane had undergone maintenance at Henderson Executive Airport (HND), Henderson, Nevada, including a 24-month/300-hour airframe inspection, completed on the day of the accident. The accident flight was the first flight after the airplane was returned to service. Both pilots reported that the brakes appeared to operate during preflight and taxi, though taxi speed was slow due to rain and lack of windshield wipers.
After an uneventful flight, the pilots configured the airplane for landing on runway 22L. The before-landing checklist included confirming the ABS was armed and pressing the ALL INTERRUPT switch to ensure the yaw damper was off. The airplane touched down in the landing zone just beyond the 1,000 ft markings. When the pilot applied brake pressure, the airplane did not decelerate and started to drift left. The co-pilot also applied brakes with no significant deceleration. With the runway end approaching, the co-pilot called for activation of the ALL INTERRUPT switch, which the pilot stated he had already pressed. The pilot applied full right pedal to steer back to the centerline, but the airplane did not respond. It departed the left side of the runway, crossed over the last two taxiways, and came to rest in a drainage culvert.
Meteorological Information
An automated observation at 1854 reported clear skies, visibility 10 statute miles, wind from 040° at 4 knots, temperature 11°C, dewpoint 3°C, and altimeter setting 30.04 inHg. At 1910 and 1915, temperature, dewpoint, and altimeter were unchanged. At 1915, wind was from 050° at 4 knots, nearly a direct tailwind for runway 22L.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Runway 22L showed tire transfer marks. The first mark from the left tire was just left of the centerline about 3,300 ft beyond the landing threshold. The mark continued veering left, crossing the side stripe at taxiway D2. Three distinct wheel marks crossed a grass area and taxiway D1, with the left tire track becoming darker. The airplane came to rest in a 6-ft-deep drainage culvert 115 ft beyond the end of runway 22L and about 180 ft left of the runway centerline. Damage included the nose structure, both flaps, partially collapsed nose and right main landing gear assemblies, and the nose wheel and left wheel/brake assembly separated from their trunnions. No heat discoloration or fluid contamination was found on brake pads or disks, which showed normal wear. The right brake was functional on test; impact damage prevented assessment of the left brake system. Left tire tread depth was between 1/32nd and 1/8th inch; right tire had ¼ inch tread. Tire pressures were 82 psi (left) and 86 psi (right).
Additional Information
The Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) provided procedures for ineffective brakes or pulling to one side: maintain directional control with rudder and steering, release brakes, press and hold ALL INTERRUPT, then reapply brakes (pump as required). The Description and Operation section stated that pressing ALL INTERRUPT disables ABS and restores normal braking; if held during heavy braking, tires may skid until pressure is reduced.
An aircraft performance study using data from the integrated diagnostic storage unit (DSU) showed the airplane departed HND about 1823, climbed to 23,000 ft, and progressed southeast. At 1902, the altimeter was set to 30.04 inHg. Flaps were set to 15° at 1908:35, landing gear extended at 1910:42, flaps to 32° 30 seconds later. The airplane aligned with the runway at 1913:00, about 3.4 nautical miles from the threshold and 1,325 ft above field elevation. Descent rate varied between 400 and 800 fpm, about 600 fpm at threshold crossing. Calculated landing distance with a 4-kt tailwind was about 3,370 ft; Vref was about 87 kts, touchdown speed (Vtd) 75 kts. At threshold, equivalent airspeed was about 18 kts above Vref; at touchdown, about 20 kts above Vtd, groundspeed about 106 kts, indicating a tailwind of about 10 kts. Touchdown occurred about 1,300 ft from the threshold, leaving 3,800 ft of runway plus 650 ft of blast pad/overrun. The left WOW sensor transitioned to ground mode about 2,490 ft from the threshold at 80 kts EAS. The airplane was still traveling about 40 kts as it veered left and departed the runway.
The DSU data recorded ALL INTERRUPT switch toggles during approach at 1910:25 and 1913:30, but no operation during the landing roll. Review of the previous 10 flights showed routine exceedances of Vref averaging 10 kts. Deceleration data from previous flights suggested that with operational brakes, the airplane might have stopped on the 150-ft blast pad had it not departed the runway laterally.
Flight Recorders
The airplane was equipped with a DSU recording GPS position and engine/airframe parameters. Control surface positions (except flaps) and brake application/brake pressure were not recorded. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder.
Tests and Research
The braking system consisted of master cylinders, hydraulic lines, and calipers with five pistons each. No boosters, thrust reversers, or spoilers. ABS comprised a brake controller (DECU), left and right brake control modules (BCM), and wheel speed transducers (WST) on each axle. Wheel speed and GPS groundspeed were compared; if a skid was detected, the BCM released brake pressure until wheel speed matched GPS speed. The ABS activated above 15 kts ground speed. The WST used an adhesive-bonded input shaft, subject to Eclipse SB 550-32-005 Rev B (inspection/test/repair to ensure bonding), but the maintenance logbooks showed no compliance; compliance was not mandatory. Later WST revisions used a keyed shaft.
Examination of the right WST through the hub cap revealed the sensor drive spline engaged with the drive slot adapter, but there was material transfer and smear marks. The drive spline was loose and could be pulled out. Testing showed the WST passed acceptance tests when the shaft was in place, but stopped producing a valid signal once pulled out about 1/8 inch. The airframe inspection completed on the accident day required wheel/hub cap removal. The maintenance manual included instructions for WST alignment and a caution about proper alignment for correct braking.
All other ABS components (BCMs, DECU, low pressure switches) met acceptance standards or showed normal service wear. ABS indicator on the instrument panel shows ARMED or INOP, but no annunciator for active skid control. Both pilots reported they did not feel ABS activation during the event.
The before-landing checklist included a warning about applying brakes in the air with ABS armed (loss of pressure), but this warning was not applicable due to an upgraded BCM on the accident airplane.
The ALL INTERRUPT switch, a red button on each sidestick, disconnects autopilot, yaw damper, flight director, and interrupts ABS, stick pusher, and trim while held. The pilot stated he pressed it just before departure.
Probable Cause
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