History of Flight
On January 2, 2023, about 1135 mountain standard time, an Embraer EMB-505, registration N555NR, was substantially damaged when it struck the ground during takeoff at Provo Municipal Airport (PVU), Provo, Utah. The pilot sustained fatal injuries, two passengers sustained serious injuries, and one passenger sustained minor injuries. The flight was conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight.
The airplane was stored in a heated hangar; the ramp area was heated with radiant heat. The airplane manager stated that preflight was typically completed inside the hangar, leaving only refueling before boarding. About 30 minutes before the accident, the pilot discussed the planned flight to Chino, California, with the manager, asking about deicing. The manager advised calling a fixed-base operator (FBO) if deicing was needed, but noted that one FBO's deice truck was out of service. The pilot did not contact the other FBO, which had an operational deice truck. The manager indicated that deicing had only been required twice in the previous eight years.
A witness removing snow saw the airplane remain in the hangar until 1055. He observed it being refueled and estimated engine start around 1110 or 1115, as light snow began. The fueler reported that while refueling, which took about 5 minutes, he observed what appeared to be unfrozen water droplets on the wings. The pilot mentioned they were trying to depart before the weather worsened. After refueling, the fueler saw the airplane taxi and begin its takeoff roll on runway 13. He described the airplane pulling up steeply, rolling left, and the left wing impacting the ground. Other witnesses reported the airplane ascending to about 20–30 feet above ground level, wings wobbling, then banking right before banking hard left and striking the ground.
Review of the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice data recorder (CVDR) revealed that at 1118, the pilot discussed seating with a passenger. At 1120, the right engine was started, and both engine anti-ice switches were turned on. The left engine anti-ice was turned off briefly, then back on. At 1129, the wing stab anti-ice system was turned on, but the pilot commented "we're gonna get wing stab arm" and then turned it off, remaining off thereafter. At 1130, the pilot performed an ice condition test and confirmed the ice sensor functioned. At 1134, he briefed a static takeoff to reduce the effect of slush on the runway. At 1135, thrust increased and ground speed rose. At 1135:48, indicated airspeed reached V1 and VR of 103 knots, with pilot callouts. Between 1135:50 and 1135:55, pitch increased. As the gear weight off wheels transitioned to 'AIR', the airplane began a left roll that progressively increased. A stall warning activated at 1135:53.7 before data ended. The pilot did not ask others to inspect the wings or announce he was looking at them.
Personnel Information
The pilot held type ratings for CE-500, CE-525S, and EMB-505 airplanes. His most recent recurrent training in the accident make and model occurred in May 2022.
Aircraft Information
The Embraer EMB-505 was equipped with a Wing and Horizontal Stabilizer Anti-Icing System, activated by a three-position switch on the ice protection panel: ON (up) activated wing and stabilizer anti-ice; OFF (middle) deactivated; and ICE SPEED RESET (down) reset the stall warning system. The Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) stated that surfaces contaminated by ice, snow, or frost must be deiced before departure, and anti-icing is required when freezing precipitation is expected. The POH also described pre-takeoff contamination checks, noting that visual inspection should be performed from inside or outside within 5 minutes of takeoff, and that the pilot should enlist trained ground personnel to inspect tail surfaces. The airplane's BEFORE TAKEOFF checklist included an ice accumulation check, requiring confirmation that surfaces were free of contamination before entering the runway.
Meteorological Information
Recorded weather at PVU at 1117 included wind variable at 6 knots, visibility 3 miles, light snow, mist, overcast ceiling at 800 feet, temperature -1°C, dew point -1°C, and altimeter 29.79 inHg. Remarks noted snow began at 1103, ended, and resumed at 1111. A trace of precipitation occurred after 1056. At 1144, conditions were similar. Radar imagery showed light precipitation over PVU at the accident time. The Graphical Forecasts for Aviation indicated light snow likely, and the Terminal Aerodrome Forecast included light snow showers around the accident time. The pilot did not contact Leidos Flight Service or receive a weather briefing from ForeFlight, though he viewed route strings the evening before.
Wreckage and Impact
Investigators arrived about 23 hours after the accident; 4–6 inches of fresh snow covered impact marks. The airplane struck the runway about 2,626 feet from the approach end of runway 13, 20 feet left of centerline, with a 91-foot scrape mark. A second scrape mark arced left, and a large impact crater contained debris. The fuselage was mostly intact, with the forward left cockpit compromised. Both wings were separated, with wing tip and winglet damage. The empennage was damaged; the upper rudder and vertical stabilizer, along with horizontal stabilizers and elevators, were separated. The ice protection panel was separated; the Wing Stab switch was found in the ON (up) position, with dried dirt beneath. Electrical continuity was established, and the anti-ice valves and air management system controller functioned normally when tested. No mechanical anomalies were noted with the flight controls.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy determined the pilot's cause of death as extensive blunt force injuries. Toxicology testing found no drugs of abuse.
Tests and Research
Performance analysis of FDR and CVDR data showed the airplane reached a maximum speed of 123 knots and radio altitude of 14 feet before data ended. After rotation, the airplane immediately rolled left to a maximum bank of 60°, and a stall warning activated at about 16° angle of attack and 1.1g vertical load factor. Runway scrapes and the impact crater indicated the left wing climbed little, if at all.