No fatalities

Runway Incursion at Bob Hope Airport Involving Mesa and SkyWest Airlines (N954LR)

Burbank, CA, United States

On February 23, 2023, a BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2D24 (registration N954LR) operated by American Eagle was involved in an aviation accident near Burbank, CA. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The interruption of the local controller’s workflow due to the necessitated management of a go-around of a third airplane that was approaching a different runway. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 17 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1785761257Data APIEditorial standards

On February 22, 2023, a Mesa Airlines CRJ-900 and a SkyWest Airlines Embraer 170-200 were involved in a runway incursion at Bob Hope Airport, with the closest separation of 1,680 ft. No injuries were reported.

Incident Overview

On February 22, 2023, at about 1855 Pacific Standard Time, Mesa Airlines flight ASH5826 (N954LR), a MHI RJ CRJ-900, and SkyWest Airlines flight SKW5326 (N619UX), an Embraer ERJ 170-200, were involved in a runway incursion at Bob Hope Airport (BUR) in Burbank, California. The closest point of separation between the two aircraft was 1,680 ft. No injuries were reported among the 73 passengers and crew on the SkyWest aircraft or the 41 passengers and crew on the Mesa aircraft.

Sequence of Events

At about 1853, the BUR local control (LC) controller instructed SKW5326 to turn right on runway 33, back taxi if necessary, and line up and wait (LUAW). The crew complied. At that time, ASH5826 was 7.9 nautical miles from the threshold at 2,800 ft above ground level on approach to runway 33. At 1853:25, the crew of ASH5826 reported they were on the visual approach. The LC advised them that SKW5326 was holding in position and instructed them to continue the approach.

SKW5326 entered runway 33 about 1853:45, back taxied, and by 1854:30 had aligned with the runway and stopped behind the threshold. At 1855:38, the LC cleared SKW5326 for takeoff from runway 33. At that time, ASH5826 was 1.6 miles from the threshold at 500 ft agl. At 1855:43, the LC cleared ASH5826 to land runway 33. After checking with the controller, ASH5826 was reaffirmed clearance to land at 1855:53. At 1855:50, SKW5326 began its takeoff roll.

At 1855:55, a pilot on ASH5826 asked if SKW5326 was clear of the runway, then stated a go-around was being initiated. ASH5826 was at 300 ft agl and 4,200 ft from the threshold, while SKW5326 was at 27 kts groundspeed accelerating across the threshold. The LC instructed ASH5826 to climb and maintain 4,000 ft. At 1856:27, the LC directed ASH5826 to turn left heading 270°. Both aircraft turned left once past the runway. The minimum horizontal separation of 1,680 ft occurred at 1857:12. The TCAS issued a resolution advisory on ASH5826. No further relevant communications occurred with SKW5326.

Aircraft and Flight Information

ASH5826 was operating as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX) to BUR under 14 CFR Part 121. SKW5326 was operating as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from BUR to San Francisco International Airport (SFO) under 14 CFR Part 121. Both aircraft were equipped with flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders; however, the CVR recordings were overwritten. FDR data were analyzed, and ADS-B data were used for precise positioning.

Communication and Separation

According to FAA Order JO 7110.65Z, controllers are required to apply a minimum of 6,000 ft separation between a departing aircraft on takeoff roll and an arriving aircraft on final approach when either is a Category III aircraft. The NTSB aircraft performance study noted that ASH5826 was 1.6 miles from the threshold when SKW5326 was cleared for takeoff. The LC had also instructed SKW5326 to LUAW, which is intended for imminent departure, but the aircraft was in position for about 90 seconds before takeoff clearance.

Aftermath

Both aircraft continued to their destinations without further incident. The NTSB investigation noted that TCAS data were not recorded for vertical resolution advisories due to equipment limitations.

Contributing factors

ATC personnel