History of Flight
On October 24, 2023, about 15:20 central daylight time, a Raytheon Hawker 850XP, N269AA, was taking off on runway 22 when its left wing struck the vertical stabilizer of a Textron Aviation (Cessna) Citation Mustang, N510HM, which was landing on runway 13R at William P. Hobby Airport (HOU), Houston, Texas. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed. No injuries occurred to the two pilots and one passenger aboard N269AA or to the one pilot and three passengers aboard N510HM. N269AA sustained minor damage, and N510HM was substantially damaged. N269AA was operating under 14 CFR Part 135 as an on-demand passenger flight from HOU to Waukesha County Airport, Wisconsin. N510HM was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 from Fulton County Executive Airport, Georgia, to HOU.
At the time of the accident, N510HM was rolling out after landing on runway 13R, while N269AA was on its takeoff roll on runway 22. According to air traffic control voice recordings, before N269AA began taxi, the flight crew contacted ground control and received clearance to taxi. About a minute later, the pilot of N510HM checked in with local control (LC) while on a nine-mile final, and the LC controller cleared the aircraft to land. N269AA taxied northeast on taxiway K and approached runway 22. At 1517:32, the N510HM pilot reported a four-mile final. At 1518:01, the LC controller instructed the N269AA crew to line up and wait (LUAW) on runway 22 but did not provide a traffic advisory regarding the other aircraft, as required. The pilot monitoring (PM) replied with "line up and wait... two two... six nine Alpha Alpha." The PM recalled that about the same time, the V-speeds were no longer displayed on the screens, leading to discussion and data re-entry. The pilot flying (PF) felt rushed, believing they had received a takeoff clearance, and elected to proceed. Both pilots recalled hearing a takeoff clearance, but recordings show no such clearance was issued near that time. N269AA entered runway 22 and began its departure roll without authorization.
As N269AA accelerated, the PF felt right rudder input, which the PM attributed to the rudder bias system. The PF reduced the throttles and reapplied them slowly, deactivating the bias. An amber elevator trim annunciator illuminated; the PM adjusted the trim wheel, and the light extinguished. At 1519:47, after the flight data/clearance delivery controller alerted LC about N269AA's movement, the LC controller stated "nine alpha alpha, stop, hold your position." No response was received. At 1519:49, the automated airport surface detection equipment sounded an alarm. The LC controller repeated the command, but still no response. At 1520:00, the collision occurred. The crew of N269AA, now airborne, informed LC they needed to return and were vectored to land on runway 13R, landing uneventfully.
The N510HM pilot stated he did not see N269AA; during the landing roll he heard a sound like a truck tire blowout but felt no yaw or controllability issues until exiting the aircraft and seeing the damage. Both N269AA crew members said they saw N510HM about one second before impact and described the impact as a "thud."
Personnel Information
The N510HM pilot, age 40, held a FAA Private Pilot certificate with multi-engine, single-engine, instrument, and CE-510/CE-510S type ratings. He had an estimated 1,000 total flight hours, with about 300 in the accident make and model.
The N269AA PF, age 69, held an FAA Airline Transport Pilot certificate with multiple type ratings. He had about 24,000 total flight hours, with about 300 in the Hawker 850XP. The PM, also the pilot in command, age 67, held an FAA Airline Transport Pilot certificate and had about 28,000 total flight hours, with about 3,800 in the accident aircraft make and model.
Aircraft Information
DuPage Aerospace Corporation, a 14 CFR Part 135 operator, operated N269AA. The Hawker 800/800XP systems include an elevator out of trim warning system and a rudder bias system. The elevator trim warning activates if trim is set outside the takeoff range with weight-on-wheels and throttles advanced. The rudder bias system uses engine bleed air to provide automatic rudder movement during engine failure.
Flight Recorders
N510HM was not equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or cockpit voice recorder (CVR), as not required. N269AA was required to have a CVR; one was installed but was not recording during the accident flight. The CVR contained two hours of audio from prior maintenance activities. The inertial switch, designed to disconnect power after impact, was found activated. Testing showed the CVR and switch functioned as designed. The operator's procedures required pilots to test the CVR before each flight; had the crew performed the test, they would have detected the inoperative CVR.
Additional Information
The LC controller, certified since May 2023, was providing services to both aircraft. The flight data/clearance delivery controller and ground controller were also on duty. The operations supervisor was providing general supervision.
The NTSB report notes that expectation bias can occur when pilots hear or see what they expect, potentially leading to misinterpretation of clearances. Both N269AA pilots underwent post-accident drug and alcohol testing; no substances or alcohol were detected.