1 fatality

6 Jun 2024: VANS AIRCRAFT INC RV-12 (N412JN) — Auburn, WA

Auburn, WA, United States

On 6 Jun 2024, a VANS AIRCRAFT INC RV-12 (registration N412JN) was involved in an aviation accident near Auburn, WA. One person was killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot’s improper installation of the control stick pushrod assemblies, which resulted in separation of the left pushrod and a total loss of roll control during flight. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

A Van's Aircraft RV-12 experimental light-sport airplane crashed near Auburn, Washington, after the pilot reported a control failure. The aircraft was substantially damaged and the pilot was fatally injured.

History of Flight

On June 6, 2024, at about 1200 Pacific daylight time, a Van's Aircraft Inc. RV-12, registration N412JN, was substantially damaged in an accident near Auburn, Washington. The pilot was fatally injured. The experimental light-sport airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The airplane departed from its base at Auburn Municipal Airport (S50) for a routine pleasure flight, according to family members. Data from the Dynon Skyview Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) indicated that shortly after takeoff, the airplane tracked southeast, then entered a 180° right turn near the eastern foothills of Mt. Rainier and returned toward Auburn. As it approached from the east, the pilot reported over the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) that he was just over midfield and intended to make a full-stop landing on runway 35.

Correlation of CTAF audio and EFIS data showed that over the next 60 seconds, the airplane overflew the runway while descending from 1,500 to 1,250 ft mean sea level (airport elevation 63 ft). It then began a left turn, and as it rolled out onto the left downwind leg, the pilot transmitted, “Pan Pan RV412JN, I just had a control failure, I’m inbound for 35, without any controls.” Over the next 45 seconds, the airplane began a descending left turn that witnesses described as similar to a spin or spiral dive.

A security camera about 0.75 miles southwest of the runway 35 threshold captured the final 3 seconds of flight. It showed the airplane in a 45° descending left turn, with a rapidly increasing roll rate, before it struck the warehouse roof inverted in a 45° nose-down attitude.

Pilot Information

The pilot received his private pilot certificate in 2010. His last logbook entry, dated May 31, 2024, showed about 270 hours of total flight time, with 79.7 hours in the accident airplane. He completed a BasicMed education course on May 7, 2024, and reported completing a BasicMed Comprehensive Medical Examination Checklist on May 6, 2024.

Aircraft Information

The pilot began construction of the airplane after purchasing the tail kit in 2011. The airplane was issued a special airworthiness certificate in the experimental category on April 19, 2021, following inspection by an FAA Designated Airworthiness Representative (DAR-F).

Wreckage and Impact Information

The airplane came to rest inside the reception area of the warehouse. The forward cabin was crushed through to the tailcone. The fuel tank was breached and leaking fuel; there was no evidence of pre- or post-impact fire. The complete right wing and the inboard section of the left wing remained attached to the fuselage by the main spar; outboard fragments of the left wing were located on the building’s roof. The tail section was largely intact. The airplane's outer surfaces were covered with vinyl wrap, which hindered a detailed review of pre-accident cracks, loose rivets, or corrosion to skin surfaces.

Medical and Pathological Information

An autopsy by the King County Medical Examiner's Office listed the cause of death as blunt force injuries. The left anterior descending coronary artery had up to 90% narrowing by plaque; other coronary arteries had scattered streaks of plaque but were not significantly narrowed. The left ventricle of the heart was described as mildly enlarged with mild concentric wall thickening. Visual examination of the heart was otherwise unremarkable. Microscopic findings included enlarged heart muscle cells.

Postmortem peripheral blood tested presumptively positive for caffeine at NMS Labs. The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory also tested specimens; no tested-for substances were detected.

Tests and Research

The airplane’s roll control system consisted of full-length flaperons connected to tandem control sticks through pushrods, torque tubes, and a centrally mounted flaperon mixer bellcrank. Examination revealed that the left control stick pushrod (F-01264-1) was not connected to the inboard eyebolt bearing (CM-4MS) at the flaperon mixer bellcrank.

Compared to the airplane’s plans, the inboard eyebolts were installed reversed: the eyebolt stud was connected to the pushrod and its body to the mixing bellcrank, instead of the opposite. In this configuration, the stud end of the eyebolt could rotate within the threaded inboard section of the pushrod. The right control stick pushrod was also installed in the same way; although still connected, its pushrod was starting to unwind from the stud, with almost two threads exposed. The construction plans called for a lock nut on the studded end of each eyebolt; these nuts were not present.

Review of construction photographs showed the build error was present during advanced stages in August 2019. The airplane’s last condition inspection was performed on April 14, 2024.

The foot pedals remained attached, and rudder cables were continuous.

The autopilot had a “Level” button feature that commanded zero vertical speed and zero bank when pressed. The autopilot roll servo was connected directly to the flaperon torque tube at the wing root, independent of the control stick integrity. Impact damage prevented accurate assessment of autopilot operation, but Dynon data indicated it was not engaged at the time of the accident. Autopilot servos were tested; no anomalies were found.

The electric pitch trim actuator anti-servo tab assembly was found at its full forward travel limit (nose-down position). It operated smoothly in both directions and shut off at travel limits. The battery supplied power to the main bus for about 2 hours after the accident.

Contributing factors

Incorrect service/maintenanceOwner/builderAileron control system — FailurePilot