Accident Overview
On January 2, 2025, at approximately 1409 Pacific standard time, an experimental amateur-built Vans Aircraft RV-10, registration N8757R, was destroyed when it struck a furniture manufacturing facility about 1,500 ft short of the approach end of runway 24 at Fullerton, California. The pilot and passenger on board were fatally injured. On the ground, 19 people sustained injuries, eight of which were serious and 11 minor. The flight was conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 for personal purposes.
Witness Observations
Security video and witness accounts provided details of the flight. A witness on the airport ramp observed the airplane taxi from a hangar to the runup area for runway 24. He noted that while the left cabin door was in the down position, it was not flush with the fuselage. Audio recordings from the Federal Aviation Administration indicated that about 1402, the pilot informed the Fullerton control tower that he was ready to taxi.
A witness on the south side of runway 24 observed the airplane after takeoff. He reported that the left door appeared open and raised, and he saw an arm reach up and pull it down as the airplane flew away. Multiple pilot witnesses on the downwind leg described the airplane flying lower than normal. They observed aggressive left banks, to the extent that the full wing profile was visible, raising concerns about a stall. Just before impact, witnesses saw a white panel-like piece detach and flutter to the ground. A dashcam video captured the airplane approximately one second before impact, with the engine audible.
Flight Data and Communication
Data from the Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) showed that the airplane began its takeoff roll at about 1407. At the end of the runway, it had climbed to about 150 ft mean sea level (msl), roughly 60 ft above ground level (agl), with a ground speed of 108 knots. Over the next 30 seconds, it continued climbing to 500 ft msl while maintaining runway heading. At that point, the pilot transmitted “immediate landing required.” The tower controller offered clearance to land on any runway, and the pilot stated he would return for runway 24. The airplane completed a 180° left turn, climbing to 950 ft msl and decelerating to 95 knots. It then flew a left downwind leg, passing the runway 24 threshold at 435 ft msl at 85 knots. Shortly after beginning a left turn, an unintelligible transmission was heard, and the airplane descended until impact.
Aircraft and Door Examination
The wreckage was found inside the furniture manufacturing facility, having struck pallet racks loaded with foam and wood materials. The forward cabin and most of both wings were consumed by fire, while the empennage was largely intact. The engine, firewall, and instrument panel assembly were located about 40 ft beyond the main wreckage, crushed but fire-free. The two-blade propeller showed chordwise scratches and leading edge nicks; the spinner was crushed with spiral scratches.
The left main cabin door was recovered on the building’s roof, about 150 ft southeast of the impact point. The door had separated from its hinges and its window was shattered. The door handle was found just short of the forward closed and locked position; the locking button had not engaged. The lock pins were extended about 1/2 inch from the door ends. When the handle was moved forward, the pins extended a further 7/16 inch and the locking button engaged.
Modifications and Design
The RV-10 design features gull-wing doors secured by fore and aft latch pins that engage with blocks in the door frame. The airplane’s kit was shipped to the pilot between 2007 and 2008, and construction was completed in 2011. Van's Aircraft Service Bulletin 10-1-4, published on January 4, 2010, recommended installation of a secondary safety latch before further flight. The pilot was sent a retrofit kit on January 25, 2010.
Examination revealed that the pilot had modified the door locking system: solid steel pins replaced the supplied aluminum pins, and chamfered aluminum blocks replaced the UHMW polyethylene blocks. The secondary safety latch was not installed. Additionally, the door latch indicator system, originally comprising four magnetic reed switches, had been modified to include only two switches, each on the aft pillars of both doors. As a result, the forward latch pins were not monitored by the warning system.