Accident Overview
On July 31, 2024, at 1540 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR20, registration N124RR, was substantially damaged during an accident near Egg Harbor City, New Jersey. The private pilot was not injured. The flight was operated as a personal flight under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
Flight and Engine Failure
The pilot departed Atlantic City International Airport (ACY) in Atlantic City, New Jersey, with an intended destination of East Hampton Town Airport (JPX) in East Hampton, New York, a distance of approximately 150 miles northeast. Preflight inspection and taxi were normal. During takeoff and initial climb, the engine operated normally. As the airplane climbed through 2,500 feet above mean sea level, the pilot reported feeling a "kick" to the right side, followed by engine roughness. The roughness led to a partial loss of power, and the pilot could no longer maintain altitude. He notified air traffic control and received clearance to return to ACY, about 6 miles away. As he approached ACY, the engine lost additional power, and it became clear he could not reach the runway. The controller provided radar vectors toward a nearby highway, but the pilot chose to attempt a forced landing in a field.
Emergency Procedures and Parachute Deployment
The pilot performed the emergency checklist, lined up for final approach to the field, and extended the flaps. However, he realized he was not properly aligned and there was an obstruction and a ditch in the middle of the field. Around that time, the engine suddenly returned to full power. Believing he could reach the ACY runway, now only 3 miles away, he turned toward the runway and began a shallow climb. Within 30 seconds of regaining full power, the engine lost power again, retaining only partial power. Out of position for a safe forced landing, the pilot activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). The airplane descended under the parachute into tree-covered terrain and became suspended in the trees, after which the pilot egressed. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and empennage.
Post-Accident Examination
The airplane's recoverable data module (RDM) was downloaded, showing data consistent with a partial loss of engine power, with significant fluctuations in engine fuel flow and RPM in the minutes before CAPS deployment. The airplane was recovered and transported to a secured hangar for examination. Recovery personnel noted angular cuts in tree limbs consistent with propeller blade contact under power. During post-accident examination, the engine crankshaft was rotated via the propeller; continuity to rear accessory gears and valvetrain was confirmed. Compression and suction were observed from all four cylinders. The throttle and mixture controls cycled through their full ranges. Fuel had the odor and color of aviation gasoline (100LL) and showed no water or contamination. The fuel supply was connected from the left fuel tank with the fuel selector in the left tank position; the electric fuel pump operated successfully. The engine was started and ran for about 10 minutes at varying speeds from idle to 2,700 rpm, with some roughness, backfires, and brief puffs of white smoke. After several minutes, the engine began operating smoothly and normally.
Induction System Failure
Examination of the engine and components revealed a circular aluminum disc inside the engine induction housing assembly. Further examination showed that the rivets attaching the two portions of the induction alternate air valve had separated. One portion was identified as the disc in the induction housing. The induction tube and valve were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for detailed examination. One valve half contained four fractured rivets embedded in the surface, protruding about 0.11 inch above the interior face. One rivet head remained attached to the other half. Optical stereoscope examination showed striations on all four fracture surfaces, interspersed with shiny planes consistent with rubbing post-fracture. Scanning electron microscope examination revealed striations consistent with fatigue crack propagation and small areas of ductile dimples consistent with final overstress failure. Rivets 1, 2, and 3 also showed ratchet marks indicating multiple cracks originating from the outer edge. The fracture features were consistent with bending or torsion-bending stresses. A review of maintenance records from the preceding 24 months revealed no maintenance or repair work on the induction system or alternate air valve. The airframe manufacturer reported no similar failures.