Casualties unknown

2025-03-21: TECNAM, P-2008 JC (SP-FDR) — Bartolini Air — Lotnisko Łódź (EPLL), PL

Lotnisko Łódź (EPLL), PL

On March 21, 2025, a TECNAM, P-2008 JC (registration SP-FDR) operated by Bartolini Air was involved in an aviation accident near Lotnisko Łódź (EPLL), PL. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Error by the 'Follow Me' driver due to reduced vigilance and confirmation bias, leading to unauthorized runway entry; and failure of TWR to enforce a full readback of the instruction. This summary draws on records from the Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL)Primary reportUpdated 1785092869Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered SP-FDR
Aircraft registered SP-FDR. Photo: Alec Wilson from Khon Kaen, Thailand / CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

A Tecnam P2008JC training flight was forced to abort landing after a 'Follow Me' vehicle mistakenly entered the active runway at EPLL due to driver error and inadequate readback enforcement by ATC.

Event Overview

On March 31, 2025, a student pilot and instructor were conducting training flights in a Tecnam P2008JC aircraft registered as SP-FDR at EPLL (Łódź Władysław Reymont Airport). During the same period, a 'Follow Me' vehicle was performing an inspection of the maneuvering area on taxiway TWY A.

Sequence of Events

The TWR assistant had authorized the 'Follow Me' driver to proceed only on taxiways, maintaining a safe distance from the runway. However, the driver misinterpreted the instruction and entered the active runway. The aircraft was on short final for runway 25 when the instructor spotted the vehicle on the runway. The instructor alerted the student and ordered a go-around. The 'Follow Me' vehicle subsequently vacated the runway, and the aircraft landed safely without further incident.

Causes and Contributing Factors

The investigation identified the following causes and contributing factors: 1. Error by the 'Follow Me' driver, who experienced reduced vigilance and a confirmation bias, mistakenly believing the instruction permitted runway entry. This error may have resulted from routine behavior and focus on the inspection rather than on the content of radio communications. 2. Failure of the TWR controller to require a full readback of the instruction from the 'Follow Me' driver.

Safety Actions

The investigating body accepted the following preventive measures: 1. Briefing of TWR EPLL operational staff on the internal PAŻP report, emphasizing the necessity of enforcing complete and correct readback of instructions concerning runway and maneuvering area occupancy. 2. The airport operator implemented corrective actions to improve the quality of radio communications related to the movement of airport services in the maneuvering area.

No safety recommendations were issued.

Probable cause

Error by the 'Follow Me' driver due to reduced vigilance and confirmation bias, leading to unauthorized runway entry; and failure of TWR to enforce a full readback of the instruction.

Investigation report by the Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL). Original record: https://pkbwl.gov.pl/raporty/2025-0009/. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Panstwowa Komisja Badania Wypadkow Lotniczych (PKBWL), Poland.