What happened
On 18 November 2025, a Piper PA-28-181 Archer III (registration 9M-SKR) operated by the Malaysian Flying Academy was conducting a solo long navigation training flight. The aircraft had completed earlier sectors of the multi-leg journey without incident before arriving at Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Airport (WMSA) in Subang.
During a touch-and-go landing on Runway 15, the student pilot touched down and initially tracked along the runway centreline. Shortly after touchdown, but before initiating the take-off phase of the manoeuvre, a loud noise was heard from the nose landing gear area. The nose of the aircraft dropped immediately, causing it to veer to the right. The pilot applied stopping actions and brought the aircraft to a halt on the right edge of the runway.
The student pilot exited the aircraft without injury and was later transported to a hospital as a precaution. External inspection revealed the aircraft resting in a nose-down attitude with the nose landing gear assembly absent and the propeller deformed.
The investigation
AAIB Malaysia examined the sequence of events, focusing on the technical mechanism of the failure and human performance factors. The investigation reviewed maintenance records, which confirmed that a previous runway excursion in August 2025 had been inspected with dye penetrant testing, showing no evidence of cracking or structural defects in the nose gear.
The analysis considered the specific dynamics of touch-and-go operations, which involve rapid configuration changes and increased pilot workload. The investigation noted that while the student pilot was properly licensed and medically fit, training records indicated that landing performance, particularly flare judgement and touchdown consistency, was still in the consolidation phase.
Findings
The probable cause was excessive loading of the nose landing gear during abnormal runway contact following a touch-and-go manoeuvre. This resulted from an improper landing technique, likely associated with bounce recovery or the transition to go-around, leading to the collapse of the nose gear.
A contributing factor was the student pilot’s developing landing proficiency under increased workload during the dynamic operation. The investigation found no systemic training deficiencies or regulatory non-compliance by the operator in authorising the flight, though it noted that the limited margin for error in such scenarios may have increased exposure to risk.
Safety action
AAIB Malaysia issued recommendations to the aircraft operator and the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM). The operator was advised to review and reinforce training guidance on bounce recovery techniques, touch-and-go execution, and go-around procedures. Additionally, the operator was recommended to review its solo release assessment criteria to ensure adequate consolidation of landing performance before authorising long navigation flights at controlled aerodromes.
CAAM was recommended to ensure that Approved Training Organisation (ATO) surveillance activities include assessments of training effectiveness in these specific areas and regarding solo release standards.