On September 15, 2000, a Boeing 727-200A N806MA operated by Miami Air Inc. was involved in an aviation accident near Ottawa, Ontario, CA. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The manner in which the descent and approach were conducted contributed to the approach being unstable. A go-around was not conducted. The unstable approach resulted in the aircraft being high and fast over the runway threshold. This summary draws on records from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.
A Miami Air Boeing 727-200A, serial 22437, overran runway 07 at Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier International Airport after an unstable approach. The aircraft stopped 234 feet beyond the runway end with no injuries or damage.
Incident Overview and Approach Details On a flight from Miami, Florida, to Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier International Airport in Ontario, a Miami Air Boeing 727-200A (serial number 22437) carried nine crew members and no passengers. The flight crew executed a radar-vectored instrument landing system approach to runway 07 with the autopilot engaged. During the descent, spoilers were deployed to reduce speed. When the initial flap was selected, a configuration warning horn activated, prompting the crew to retract the spoilers. The aircraft leveled off at 2,000 feet above sea level on the localizer for approximately 30 seconds before intercepting the glideslope. Twelve seconds later, it leveled off again at 1,850 feet for 10 seconds before resuming descent. The aircraft crossed the final approach fix at the correct altitude but at approximately 180 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), significantly higher than the 130 KIAS approach speed required for its weight. Ten seconds later, the aircraft leveled off once more, leading the captain to disconnect the autopilot and manually fly the aircraft to re-intercept the glideslope. Visual contact with the runway environment was established as the aircraft approached 1,000 feet above ground level. ## Runway Overrun and Aftermath The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 160 KIAS and 110 feet above ground level, touching down 3,800 feet past the threshold at 148 KIAS. The crew initially selected idle reverse thrust and applied minimal braking. As the aircraft neared the far end of the runway, reverse thrust and braking were increased to maximum. The aircraft came to a stop 234 feet beyond the end of runway 07 at 0042 eastern daylight time. No damage to the aircraft or injuries to the crew were reported. ## Aircraft Performance and Braking Analysis The aircraft's landing weight was approximately 130,000 pounds, within weight and balance limits. Miami Air documentation indicated a reference speed (Vref) of 126 KIAS for this weight, while the manufacturer specified 124 KIAS, which would typically result in a touchdown speed of about 117 KIAS. The flight operations manual required the aircraft to be stabilized at the proper approach speed by the final approach fix, with other sections suggesting a go-around or missed approach if the approach was unstable. The desired touchdown point was 1,000 feet from the threshold, with a 500-foot tolerance. A winter operations handout advised against floating and recommended flying the aircraft firmly onto the runway at the aiming point, even if speed was excessive. However, the captain's normal technique, as demonstrated in this occurrence, involved attempting a smooth landing by gently easing the aircraft onto the runway. Flight data recorder (FDR) calculations confirmed the touchdown point 3,800 feet from the threshold, consistent with tower controller observations placing the touchdown between Echo and Foxtrot taxiways. ## Runway Conditions and Hydroplaning Investigation Runway 07 at Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier International Airport is 8,000 feet long and 200 feet wide with an asphalt surface. The last 2,000 to 1,000 feet had rubber deposits from landings on runway 25. The runway was wet but had no standing water. The magnetic heading and localizer course were 071 degrees (57 degrees true), with a 3-degree glidepath angle. The instrument landing system was flight-checked by Nav Canada approximately 15 hours after the occurrence and found to be within acceptable technical tolerances. Examination of the aircraft's tires and the runway revealed no signs of hydroplaning. The tires showed no reverted rubber or excessive wear, and the runway had no reverted rubber steaming. The FDR indicated no significant heading deviations, ruling out sideslipping. Light skid marks from all three gears were found in the last 75 feet of the runway. The nosewheel skid marks were caused by the aircraft turning at the last moment to avoid the approach lights, as nosewheel brakes were not installed. Boeing's analysis of FDR longitudinal deceleration parameters showed that four seconds after touchdown, brakes were applied and reverse thrust selected. For the next six seconds, stopping forces comprised approximately 5% from brakes, 27% from reverse thrust, and the remainder from aerodynamic drag. Brake stopping force increased to 70% over the next 10 seconds. Reverse thrust stopping force peaked at 35% at 13 seconds after touchdown, then decreased to 20% by 20 seconds. In the final nine seconds, brake stopping force increased sharply to over 95%, with full reverse thrust selected until the aircraft stopped. ## Post-Occurrence Inspection and Maintenance Miami Air maintenance personnel inspected the aircraft after the occurrence and replaced the antiskid/autobrake control module, finding the remainder of the aircraft serviceable. The module was sent to the manufacturer for testing and passed all acceptance checks, being deemed serviceable. During the occurrence flight, the antiskid system was selected on, and the autobrakes were selected off. ## Landing Distance Calculations The slippery runway landing distance chart for the Boeing 727 indicated a landing distance of approximately 3,600 feet (including 1,000 feet to flare) with flaps at 30 degrees, a weight of 130,000 pounds, zero wind, maximum manual braking, idle reverse, and a wet runway. The chart includes a speed adjustment: for every 5 KIAS above Vref, landing distance increases by 155 feet. Given the 160 KIAS threshold crossing speed, an additional approximately 1,050 feet was added, resulting in a total distance of 4,650 feet from the threshold, or a stopping distance of 3,650 feet. The 110-foot threshold crossing height added about 1,000 feet to the landing distance. ## Crew Qualifications and Weather Conditions The flight crew were qualified and certified for the occurrence flight. The captain had approximately 15,000 hours of flying experience, including 8,000 hours on the Boeing 727. The first officer had approximately 5,700 hours of experience, including 500 hours on the Boeing 727. The flight engineer had been an aircraft mechanic for approximately 29 years and had about 4,000 hours of flying experience as a flight engineer. Weather at 0000 eastern daylight time (EDT) included few clouds at 200 feet above ground level, an estimated broken layer at 2,200 feet, an estimated overcast layer at 4,500 feet, visibility of 2 miles in moderate rain and fog, a temperature of 14 degrees Celsius, wind from 120 degrees true at 6 knots, and an altimeter setting of 29.69 inches of mercury. The 0033 weather report, the latest issued before the occurrence, showed a measured broken cloud ceiling at 500 feet, an overcast layer at 2,200 feet, visibility of 6 miles in light rain and fog with recent rain, and wind from 120 degrees true at 6 knots. No temperature, dewpoint, or altimeter was recorded in the 0033 report. ## Air Traffic Control and Emergency Response The flight crew received the 0000 weather information from the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) but did not receive the 0033 weather information. The tower controller is responsible for updating the ATIS during quiet hours with current weather from the weather observer. Current weather reports are displayed on operational information display system (OIDS) screens at control positions. When a new weather report is issued, the OIDS screen changes to reflect the latest weather. A second computer system at the air traffic operational specialist (ATOS) position displays a “new weather” message. Controllers expect hourly weather reports to arrive five to eight minutes after the hour and check their computers at that time. Special weather reports are faxed to the control tower. If the controller is not viewing the OIDS display, not looking at the ATOS position computers, or is working in another operational program at the ATOS computer, the “new weather” message will not be visible, and the controller will be unaware of the new weather information. The fax machine has no alert system for incoming faxes. On the night of the occurrence, a special weather report was issued at 0033 and faxed to the tower, but the controller was unaware of it at the time of the occurrence. The tower controller informed the flight crew that emergency response services (ERS) vehicles were responding; they arrived at the aircraft shortly thereafter. While the ERS vehicles were en route, the ERS supervisor radioed the control tower to ask for the number of passengers, remaining fuel, and whether any dangerous goods were on board. The tower controller did not have this information. In accordance with the Canadian Aviation Regulations, Ottawa airport has a documented emergency response plan. This plan lists actions for control tower staff in the event of an aircraft crash, including activating the crash alarm and notifying ERS by radio of the number of passengers, remaining fuel, and any dangerous goods on board. ## Conclusions Post-occurrence examination revealed the braking system was serviceable, and it was concluded that the aircraft did not hydroplane. The brakes were operating, as shown by the skid marks in the last 75 feet of the runway. At the correct threshold crossing height and speed, the aircraft could easily have been stopped on the wet runway. Considering the actual threshold crossing height and speed, the aircraft could have been stopped on the runway with autobrakes set to medium. The manner in which the descent and approach were conducted contributed to the approach being unstable. A go-around was not conducted. The unstable approach resulted in the aircraft being high and fast over the runway threshold. The aircraft's excessive altitude and speed over the threshold, combined with the lack of a go-around, led to the runway overrun.
Probable cause
The manner in which the descent and approach were conducted contributed to the approach being unstable. A go-around was not conducted. The unstable approach resulted in the aircraft being high and fast over the runway threshold. The aircraft's excessive altitude and speed over the threshold, combined with the lack of a go-around, led to the runway overrun.
