Casualties unknown

Volga-Dnepr Airlines Flight 2100 Runway Overrun at Gander

Gander, Newfoundland and Labrador, CA

On March 31, 2007, an Antonov AN 124-100 RA-82078 operated by Volga-Dnepr Airlines was involved in an aviation accident near Gander, Newfoundland and Labrador, CA. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The overrun was caused by a long touchdown on a snow-contaminated runway, which reduced available stopping distance, combined with delayed wheel-brake application and failure to maintain maximum available reverse thrust until it was ensured the aircraft would… This summary draws on records from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB); 2 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)Primary reportUpdated 2026-09-13Data APIEditorial standards

On 31 March 2007, a Volga-Dnepr Airlines Antonov AN-124-100 (RA-82078) overran Runway 03/21 at Gander after a long touchdown on a snow-contaminated surface. All 19 occupants exited without injury.

Incident Overview On 31 March 2007, Volga-Dnepr Airlines Flight 2100, an Antonov AN-124-100 with registration RA-82078 and serial number 38718017006, was operating from Greer, South Carolina, to Gander, Newfoundland and Labrador. The aircraft arrived at Gander and completed an approach to Runway 03/21. It touched down at 0216 Newfoundland daylight time but could not stop before the end of the runway. The aircraft left the left side of the runway near the departure end and came to rest about 480 feet off the runway surface, facing the opposite direction. Several runway edge lights were damaged. The nine crew members and ten passengers on board exited without injury, and aircraft damage was limited to cuts in the tires. ## Operational and Environmental Factors The operating crew consisted of a captain, first officer, two flight engineers, a navigator, and a radio operator. Additional crew members were on board but not operating. The captain at the controls had previously landed at Gander about 35 times. The aircraft was within weight and centre-of-gravity limits, and no mechanical malfunctions were found. Gander has two asphalt runways. Runway 03/21 is 10,200 feet long and 200 feet wide, with a 0.34 per cent upslope when landing. Runway 13/31 is 8,900 feet long and 200 feet wide, with a 0.50 per cent downslope when landing. Both runways are served by instrument landing systems. The flight departed Greer at 2236 Newfoundland daylight time, and the en-route portion was uneventful. The crew had planned to use Runway 03/21, the longer runway, which Volga-Dnepr crews often used when conditions permitted. The ATIS indicated Runway 03/21 was bare and wet, while Runway 13/31 was active. Twelve minutes before landing, a special weather observation reported light snowfall. The crew did not request an updated runway surface condition report. ## Contributing Factors The aircraft touched down about 2,400 feet beyond the normal touchdown point, at an airspeed 14 knots below the planned airspeed, indicating a float. The contaminated runway surface increased the stopping distance required. Wheel braking was applied by both pilots five seconds after the planned brake application speed of 135 knots, or 2,000 feet after touchdown, leaving about 4,800 feet of runway available. Flight data analysis suggested the initial deceleration may have been sufficient to stop the aircraft before the runway end. The crew used reverse thrust but did not maintain maximum available reverse thrust until it was certain the aircraft would stop on the remaining runway. The limited effect of reverse thrust below 90 knots and the absence of residual forward thrust during the 15 seconds the idle power setting was restored may have been enough to prevent the overrun. ## Safety Actions Volga-Dnepr Airlines arranged with the Gander International Airport Authority to provide Canadian runway friction index reporting for each third of the runway upon request. The airline also completed its own investigation and developed an in-house safety assurance program for intensive flight operations through Gander for the 2007-2008 season, which it expected to make permanent. It was compiling a table to translate CRFI values into friction coefficients, expected to be ready by the 2008-2009 winter season. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada sent an aviation safety information letter to Transport Canada regarding differences between Canadian practices and ICAO recommended practices for reporting runway friction measurements. The TSB concluded its investigation and authorized release of the report on 1 May 2008.

Probable cause

The overrun was caused by a long touchdown on a snow-contaminated runway, which reduced available stopping distance, combined with delayed wheel-brake application and failure to maintain maximum available reverse thrust until it was ensured the aircraft would stop on the remaining runway.