History of the Flight
The occurrence flight was the fifth and final sector of the day for the aircraft and flight crew. The crew began their day at 1330 at Porter Airlines' main base at Toronto City Centre Airport. The captain served as pilot flying (PF) on the third and fourth sectors, while the first officer was PF on all other sectors, including the occurrence sector. This sector was conducted at night.
Weather
At 2200, the METAR for Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier International Airport reported winds from 070° True at 12 knots, visibility 4 statute miles in mist, overcast ceiling at 300 feet agl, temperature 7°C, dew point 6°C, and altimeter 29.62 inches of mercury. The ceiling consisted of 8 octas of stratus, and pressure was falling. The ATIS at 2100 indicated winds 080° Magnetic at 12 knots, and the tower at 2210 reported winds 090° Magnetic at 13 knots. The flight crew were in instrument meteorological conditions until clearing cloud at approximately 400 feet.
Aircraft
The aircraft, a Bombardier DHC-8-402 (registration C-GLQD, serial number 4138), was certified, equipped, and maintained per regulations. Weight and center of gravity were within limits. The DHC-8-400 series has a 107-foot 9-inch fuselage, with a contact pitch angle of 7.5° due to main landing gear length. The probability of aft fuselage/runway contact is higher with flaps 15° than flaps 35°, due to a nominal approach pitch attitude of 2° to 3° versus −2° to −1°. Bombardier statistics report 20 DHC-8 aft fuselage contact events worldwide (ten on the 300 series, ten on the 400 series). After 12 events, Bombardier created a "Pitch Awareness" training video and recommended operators develop pitch awareness SOPs.
Procedures
The Aeroplane Operating Manual specifies normal approach speed of 170 knots to approximately 5 nm, then gradual reduction to Vref by 500 feet. Porter SOPs require stabilized approach criteria: at 500 feet, airspeed must be Vref (+10/−0 knots). The pilot monitoring (PM) calls "Stabilized" or "Not stabilized"; below 500 feet, "Not stabilized" requires a go-around. Section 2.17.2 defines pitch callouts: below 100 feet, PM calls out pitch if ≥5°; at 6°, PF responds "correcting" or executes a go-around. AOM notes state "DO NOT exceed 6° nose up during landing flare to avoid fuselage contact."
Flight Crew
Both crewmembers were certified and qualified. The captain, employed since September 2006, had about 8700 total hours, 4500 on DHC-8, and 1500 on the DHC-8-400. He completed a "Pitch Awareness" CBT and was recently upgraded to training captain. The first officer, hired in February 2009, had about 2550 total hours, including 17 hours on the DHC-8-400, and was undergoing line indoctrination. His previous experience was on light aircraft, and this was his first night landing outside the simulator. He completed the pitch awareness CBT during initial type rating.
Training
The pitch awareness CBT is a short video and six questions emphasizing arresting high descent rates with power, not pitch. No specific flight training scripted in simulators reinforced this procedure. The first officer was scheduled to complete pitch awareness SOPs later in line indoctrination. During three previous trips with three different training captains, the first officer had difficulty timing the flare. On the occurrence day, his first flare in Ottawa was too early, the second too late, and the third resulted in aft fuselage contact.
The Approach
The crew was cleared for the ILS approach to Runway 07. The approach was flown on autopilot (no autothrottle). Vref was set to 116 knots. The captain instructed the first officer to resist flaring until the 10-foot GPWS callout due to prior flare difficulties. Above 1000 feet, aircraft was configured with gear down and flaps 15°. At 1000 feet, all stabilized criteria were met but airspeed was increasing. Between 1000 and 650 feet, airspeed increased from 120 to 134 knots; after power reduction to 10% at 650 feet, airspeed decreased. At 500 feet, a "Stabilized" call was made. At 200 feet, autopilot was disengaged; pitch decreased from 4.1° to 3.1° at 100 feet, causing descent below glideslope. Rate of descent increased from 570 fpm to average 840 fpm between 200 and 10 feet. At 50 feet, GPWS callouts began; at 20 feet, captain instructed flare. Pitch increased rapidly from 3.1° to 7.5°, and the aircraft landed firmly with aft fuselage contacting the runway. Weather was not considered a factor; winds were not strong or gusty. The captain was new to line instruction, and the first officer had difficulty timing the flare. The crew likely focused on achieving a successful flare to the exclusion of monitoring descent rate and glideslope deviation.