Aircraft Tailstrike During Visual Approach at Acapulco

Flight Details and Incident Overview On 14 December 1994, a Boeing 757 with the registration C-FXOO was operating as Canada 3000 international charter flight CMM 3507. The aircraft, en route from Toronto, Canada, to Acapulco, Mexico, carried a flight crew of two, a cabin crew of seven, and 167 passengers. The flight had been airborne for four hours and 53 minutes upon arrival at Acapulco. During the final approach to runway 28, the aircraft suffered a tailstrike upon landing. The incident resulted in only minor damage to the aircraft, and there were no reported injuries to the crew or passengers. ## Approach Deviations and Contributing Factors The investigation identified that the flight crew did not adhere to standard operating procedures (SOPs) during the approach. The captain, acting as the pilot flying, initially briefed a visual approach but subsequently coupled the autopilot to the Instrument Landing System (ILS) without re-briefing the first officer. The captain deployed speed brakes shortly after intercepting the glide slope, a maneuver not approved by the manufacturer or the company for use during final approach. Furthermore, the landing gear and flaps were extended later than the prescribed procedures required. At the 500-foot above ground level (AGL) stabilization point, both pilots were aware that the approach was not stabilized in the landing configuration. However, the captain decided to continue the approach, believing the situation could be salvaged. The first officer, citing limited line experience and a reluctance to challenge the experienced captain, did not effectively advocate for a missed approach. ## Safety and Procedural Failures The tailstrike was directly caused by the speed brakes remaining deployed at the time of touchdown, which necessitated a high pitch angle to maintain lift. The investigation highlighted several contributing factors, including ineffective crew resource management (CRM), incomplete checklist procedures, and a lack of assertiveness from the first officer. The first officer failed to make mandatory calls regarding the high rate of descent, excessive speed, and high pitch attitude. The board noted that the captain's focus on external visual cues rather than instrument displays, combined with a lack of clear communication with the first officer, led to a breakdown in situational awareness and rushed procedures. Despite the presence of various aircraft warnings and configuration cautions, the crew was unable to prevent the occurrence due to these procedural and communication failures.