Douglas DC-9-31 accident at Florida, 18 May 1972

Accident narrative

On May 18, 1972, at approximately 1521 eastern daylight time, Eastern Air Lines Flight 346, a Douglas DC-9-31, touched down hard on Runway 9L at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport in Florida. The main landing gear failed, and the tail section separated from the aircraft as it skidded down the runway. The aircraft was destroyed by subsequent ground fire. Of the six passengers and four crewmembers aboard, the captain, one stewardess, and one passenger sustained nonfatal injuries.

**The flight**

Flight 346 was a scheduled passenger flight from Miami, Florida, to Cleveland, Ohio, with an intermediate stop at Fort Lauderdale. The flight crew consisted of Captain Walter C. Kennedy, who had 16,500 flying hours including 260 in the DC-9, and First Officer George K. Mathis, Jr., who had 3,000 flying hours with 1,800 in the DC-9. For the leg to Fort Lauderdale, the first officer was flying the aircraft from the right seat while the captain assumed copilot duties.

**The sequence of events**

The flight departed Miami at 1511 on an instrument flight rules clearance. Miami Approach Control cleared the flight to descend to 2,000 feet and advised them of the Fort Lauderdale weather: "estimated seven hundred overcast one-half mile thunderstorm, heavy rainshower." The flight acknowledged the advisory.

At 1515, Miami Approach advised Flight 346 and a preceding Northeast Airlines DC-9 that the glide-slope portion of the instrument landing system was out of service. The controller asked Flight 346 for their required weather minima with the glide slope inoperative and whether they were going to attempt the approach. The flight replied, "...if we got seven hundred is enough." The Northeast flight opted to hold for better weather.

Flight 346 was cleared to descend to 1,700 feet and vectored to the final approach course. At 1518, the flight contacted the Fort Lauderdale Tower. The tower controller instructed them to report the marker inbound and subsequently advised: "We're estimated seven hundred overcast, half mile, thunderstorm, heavy rainshower over the airport." The controller then stated the glide slope appeared to be back in service, but almost immediately advised it had gone out again. Flight 346 did not respond to these transmissions.

According to the first officer, he commenced the descent from 1,500 feet and leveled off at the minimum descent altitude of 460 feet. The captain stated he took over the approach at this point, putting down full 50-degree flaps and closing the throttles to land within the touchdown zone. The captain stated that while descending through approximately 200 feet, they flew into a "veritable wall of water." The first officer called out that the runway was right under them. The captain stated he pulled back on the elevators but felt they did not respond fully, which he believed was the result of a severe downdraft.

Eyewitnesses near the approach end of the runway stated a heavy rainshower was occurring. They observed the aircraft appearing higher than normal and descending in a nose-down attitude. Witnesses recalled the aircraft appeared to flare momentarily before dropping almost vertically onto the runway. Tower controllers first observed the aircraft sliding down the runway on fire and barely visible through the heavy rain.

All occupants evacuated through the forward main entry door in approximately 36 seconds.

**What the investigation found**

Examination of the runway revealed the aircraft made initial contact on its right main landing gear 1,020 feet from the end of the runway. The aircraft skidded for approximately 2,800 feet, departed the right side of the runway, and pivoted before coming to a stop. The right main landing gear was separated, the left main landing gear was pushed up and to the rear, and the tail section had separated. The aircraft structure, powerplants, and flight control systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.

The Board noted that the measured visibility of one-half mile, reported to the flight twice prior to the landing attempt, was below the published minima required for the approach. The published visibility minimum for a localizer approach with the glide slope out of service was one mile.

The captain stated he did not hear the weather reports regarding visibility and thunderstorms because he was occupied with company communications, and that the first officer only advised him of the 700-foot ceiling. The first officer stated he remembered the 700-foot ceiling but could not recall hearing the one-half mile visibility. However, the Board's review of the cockpit voice recorder showed the captain was on the air traffic control frequency during some of the conversations regarding weather and minima.

The Board concluded that heavy rainshowers were obscuring the runway during the final stages of the approach. Based on the time between the aircraft passing the middle marker and the end of the cockpit voice recording, the Board calculated the aircraft descended 450 feet at an average rate of nearly 2,000 feet per minute. The Board found that the combination of a high drag configuration (50-degree flaps and gear down) and idle power resulted in a relatively high rate of sink. The Board found no observations or related evidence to substantiate the captain's belief that a severe downdraft occurred.

An analysis of the flight management showed that crew coordination and performance were undisciplined. Checklists were not accomplished using the prescribed challenge and response system, the flight did not report passing the outer marker as requested, and the landing was initiated without a prescribed landing clearance.

**Probable cause**

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was "the decision of the pilot to initiate and continue an instrument approach under weather conditions which precluded adequate visual reference and the faulty techniques used by the pilot during the landing phase of that approach."

The Board also found that "the flightcrew's nonadherence to prescribed operational practices and procedures compromised the safe operation of the flight."