Incident Overview
On October 10, 2015, at approximately 16:54 Japan Standard Time, a serious air proximity incident occurred on the final approach course about 0.8 nautical miles (approximately 1,500 meters) from the threshold of Runway 34 at Kagoshima Airport. The aircraft involved were Japan Airlines Co., Ltd. Boeing 767-300, registered JA8364 (Aircraft A), and New Japan Aviation Co., Ltd. Britten-Norman BN-2B-20, registered JA80CT (Aircraft B). No injuries or damage to either aircraft were reported.
Sequence of Events
Aircraft A departed Tokyo International Airport at 15:16 bound for Kagoshima Airport, with the pilot in command (PIC) as pilot monitoring (PM) in the left seat and the first officer (F/O) as pilot flying (PF) in the right seat. Aircraft B took off from Runway 34 at Kagoshima Airport at 16:40 with the intention of flying a traffic pattern and returning to land, aiming to augment the PIC's recent flight experience and inspect the ILS receiver equipment. The PIC occupied the left seat and a mechanic the right seat.
At 16:43, Aircraft B received instructions from the aerodrome control position (the Tower) to hold on the downwind leg due to arriving aircraft queue. At 16:46:11, Controller A informed Aircraft B that the holding time would be about 10 minutes. At 16:49:15, Controller A provided traffic information stating that Aircraft B was following a Boeing 767 13 nautical miles on final. The PIC of Aircraft B acknowledged.
At 16:50:52, Controller A instructed Aircraft B to report traffic in sight, noting the preceding traffic was 9 nautical miles on final. At 16:51:34, the PIC of Aircraft B sighted a DHC-8 on final approach about 1 nautical mile from the threshold and reported "Final traffic in sight." Controller A interpreted this as sighting of Aircraft A and instructed Aircraft B to "Follow the traffic." Aircraft B proceeded to the final approach path without being noticed by Aircraft A.
Controller B, observing from the tower, noticed Aircraft B on the base leg and questioned whether it would enter in front of Aircraft A. Controller A, focused on a helicopter he planned to instruct after Aircraft B, initially thought Aircraft A was ahead. When he redirected attention, Aircraft B had already entered the final approach. At that moment, Aircraft A reported traffic ahead. The Tower then instructed Aircraft B to break to the west and maintain altitude.
The PIC of Aircraft A first detected Aircraft B via TCAS traffic advisory (TA) without altitude information on the HSI and visually confirmed the aircraft near the base leg. As Aircraft B cut into its flight path, the PIC reported to the Tower and, feeling danger, decided to go around. Both the PIC and F/O initiated go-around simultaneously. After starting ascent, the PIC lost sight of Aircraft B but continued ascending straight path, later flying the missed approach course.
Aircraft B did not notice Aircraft A until it passed overhead to the right, then broke west as instructed, maintaining altitude.
Aircraft and Personnel
- Aircraft A: Boeing 767-300, registration JA8364, operated by Japan Airlines Co., Ltd.
- Aircraft B: Britten-Norman BN-2B-20, registration JA80CT, operated by New Japan Aviation Co., Ltd.
- Crew on Aircraft A: PIC (left seat, PM) and F/O (right seat, PF).
- Crew on Aircraft B: PIC (left seat) and a mechanic (right seat).
Meteorological Information
At 17:00, Kagoshima Airport reported wind from 210° at 3 knots, varying between 190° and 270°, visibility 10 km or more, few clouds at 2,500 ft (cumulus) and scattered clouds at 16,000 ft (stratocumulus), temperature 20°C, dew point 15°C, QNH 29.91 inHg.
Additional Information
- Kagoshima Airport elevation is 862 ft (approx. 272 m), with Runway 16/34, length 3,000 m, width 45 m.
- Aircraft A was equipped with flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, which retained records of the incident.
- Aircraft B's transponder was functioning but altitude information was not recorded by radar.
- Air traffic control procedures for "FOLLOW" instructions are outlined in the Air Traffic Service Procedure Handbook, specifying that when issuing such instructions, controllers must ensure following aircraft confirm the location of the preceding aircraft.
The incident was classified as a serious incident under Japanese regulations following a Near Collision Report submitted on October 11, 2015. The Japan Transport Safety Board investigated, with accredited representatives from the United States and the United Kingdom.