Accident Sequence
At approximately 1536 eastern standard time, First Air flight 802, a Hawker Siddeley HS-748-2A (serial number 1759), was on a scheduled flight from Iqaluit to Igloolik, Nunavut. The aircraft carried two flight crew, one flight attendant, one loadmaster, and three passengers. During the take-off run on runway 36, at rotation speed (VR), the captain rotated the aircraft but it did not become airborne. Approximately seven seconds after VR, the captain called for and initiated a rejected take-off. The aircraft could not be stopped on the runway. The nose-wheel gear collapsed as the aircraft rolled through soft ground beyond the runway end. The aircraft struck the localizer antenna and continued skidding approximately 700 feet, coming to rest in a ravine in a nose-down attitude about 800 feet off the declared runway end. The flight attendant initiated an evacuation through the left main rear cabin door. Both pilots evacuated through the cockpit windows and joined the passengers and flight attendant at the rear. The flight attendant was slightly injured during the sudden deceleration. The aircraft was substantially damaged.
Findings
The official investigation identified several causes and contributing factors. The captain rejected the take-off at a speed well above the engine-failure recognition speed (V1) with insufficient runway remaining to stop before the end of the runway. The far-forward position of the centre of gravity contributed to the pilot not rotating the aircraft to the normal take-off attitude. The aircraft never achieved the required pitch for take-off; the captain's inability to accurately assess the pitch attitude was probably influenced by the heavier than normal elevator control forces and the limited nighttime visual references. The loadmaster did not follow the company- and Transport Canada-approved procedures to evaluate the excess baggage added to the aircraft, which led to a discrepancy of 450 pounds and a centre of gravity position further forward than expected. Performance analysis suggested that the aircraft was under-rotated as a result of a forward centre of gravity loading and the generated lift never exceeded the aircraft's weight during the take-off attempt.
Risk factors included the aircraft being approximately 200 pounds over maximum gross take-off weight, slower acceleration probably due to snow on the runway, and possible contamination though it could not be determined if present or if it degraded performance. Water methanol was not used for the take-off; its use may have reduced the consequences of the rejected take-off. The captain did not call for the overrun drill, and none of the items on the checklist were covered by the crew. The co-pilot did not follow the emergency checklist or call air traffic control to advise of the rejected take-off or call over the public address system to advise passengers to brace. The aircraft lost all electrical systems during impact with large rocks, rendering radios unserviceable. No HS-748 simulator existed for training on various take-off and rejected take-off scenarios. There was confusion regarding the aircraft's location; the flight service station, fire trucks, and intervening teams were not using an available grid map for orientation. Other findings noted that the aircraft's brakes, anti-skid system, and tires functioned properly throughout the rejected take-off.