Fatal Ghardaïa Approach Accident Involving a Charter Flight from Hassi R'Mel-Tilrhempt (7T-VIN)

Flight Details and Initial Approach The aircraft departed Hassi R'Mel-Tilrhempt Airport at 2030 local time for a 15-minute charter flight to Ghardaïa. The flight carried three crew members and two employees of Sonatrach, the Société Nationale pour le Transport et la Commercialisation d’Hydrocarbures. At 2044 local time, the crew received clearance for a right-hand circuit in preparation for an approach to runway 30. At that time, a Boeing 727 inbound from Djanet was on long finals. The copilot stated that he intended to conduct an NDB/ILS approach to runway 30, but the captain preferred a visual approach. The copilot followed the captain's course and descent instructions with hesitation. ## EGPWS Activation and Loss of Control At 2057 local time, the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) alarm sounded. Power was added and a climb was initiated from a lowest altitude of 240 feet above ground level. The captain then took over control and assumed the role of Pilot Flying. The airplane maneuvered south of the airport until 2101 local time, when the copilot saw the runway. The captain rolled left to -57° and pitched down to -18.9° to steer the airplane toward the runway. The EGPWS sounded again, but the descent continued until the airplane impacted the ground and broke up. ## Casualties and Aircraft Damage All five occupants were injured, and the aircraft was destroyed. A day later, the copilot died from his injuries. ## Official Probable Cause Findings The investigation commission concluded that the accident resulted from a series of causes that, taken separately, would not have led to an accident. These causes included: 1) a lack of rigor in the approach and landing phase, evidenced by a failure to follow standard operating procedures, including the arrival checklist; 2) a failure to strictly comply with the holding, approach, and landing procedures in force for the aerodrome of Ghardaïa; 3) the captain appearing occupied by visual search maneuvers, which temporarily removed him from the control loop and caused him to abandon monitoring of critical flight parameters, leading to complete disorientation; 4) the crew's failure to respond appropriately to multiple alarms, indicating a lack of control in the operation of the aircraft in that situation, apparently due to a lack of training on this aircraft type; 5) activities in the southern part of Algeria potentially causing a routine that promoted the tendency to conduct visual approaches, with the crew appearing more experienced in visual flights; and 6) a lack of coordination and communication between the crew members, who were flying together for the first time.