Accident Sequence
The accident occurred shortly after takeoff on a repositioning flight for the airplane's upcoming annual inspection. Numerous witnesses, including two air traffic controllers, reported observing a normal climb until the airplane was about half a mile beyond the runway. The airplane then underwent a short series of attitude excursions, rolled to the right, and descended steeply into a lagoon. Radio communications between the airplane and controllers were normal. Ground-based radar data indicated the airplane climbed to about 500 feet and was airborne for approximately 40 seconds.
Postaccident Examination
Examination of the airframe, systems, and engines revealed no mechanical failures that would have prevented continued normal operation. Damage to both engine propeller blades suggested low or moderate power at impact, with the right propeller blades exhibiting less damage than the left. The propeller damage, witness-observed dynamics, and trajectory were consistent with a loss of power in the right engine, followed by a loss of control due to airspeed decay below the minimum control speed (VMC). The underlying reason for the loss of power in the right engine could not be determined.
Certification and Markings
No evidence of a cockpit placard designating single-engine operating speeds, including VMC, was found in the wreckage, although such a placard was required by the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual. The airplane's certification basis, Civil Air Regulation (CAR) 3, did not require a red radial line for VMC or a blue radial line for single-engine climb speed (VYSE) on the airspeed indicators; no such markings were observed on the indicators in the wreckage. These markings were mandated only for airplanes certificated under Federal Aviation Regulation Part 23, which became effective about three years after the accident airplane was manufactured. The FAA and the airplane manufacturer did not mandate or recommend such markings for this model. A cursory search found no retroactive guidance for any twin-engine airplane models certificated under CAR 3. Follow-up communication from the FAA Small Airplane Directorate indicated that the FAA had not discussed retroactive action, and that the insurance industry had restricted such airplanes to a select group of pilot/owners.
Toxicological Findings
Toxicology testing revealed evidence consistent with previous use of marijuana by the pilot, but it was not possible to determine when that usage occurred or whether the pilot might have been impaired during the accident flight.