Accident Overview
Air Creebec flight CRQ 501, a Beechcraft A100 (registration C-FNIF, serial number B-178), was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from Val-d'Or, Quebec to Chibougamau/Chapais, Quebec, with two pilots on board. The aircraft was destroyed by fire after impacting the runway, and both pilots suffered fatal injuries.
Sequence of Events
The aircraft conducted a non-precision approach to Runway 05, followed by a go-around. During the second approach, the aircraft descended below the cloud cover to the left of the runway centerline. The pilot executed a right turn toward the runway, then a steep left turn to align with the centerline. Following this turn, the aircraft struck the runway approximately 500 feet from the threshold. A fire broke out on impact, and the aircraft continued for nearly 400 feet before stopping about 50 feet north of the runway. First responders attempted to control the fire with portable fire extinguishers but were unsuccessful. The Chibougamau and Chapais fire departments arrived at about 0926 eastern daylight time, roughly 26 minutes after the crash. The aircraft was destroyed by the fire.
Probable Cause
The investigation identified the following causes and contributing factors:
- The aircraft was configured late for the approach, resulting in an unstable approach condition.
- The pilot flying carried out a steep turn at a low altitude, increasing the load factor, which caused the aircraft to stall at an altitude too low for stall recovery.
Related Findings
Additional findings included:
- Time spent programming the global positioning system reduced time for flight management, resulting in missed radio communications on the mandatory frequency, failure to activate the aircraft radio control of aerodrome lighting (ARCAL), missed verbal calls per standard operating procedures (SOPs), and late configuration for approach and landing.
- During the second approach, the aircraft performed a race-track pattern and descended below the safe obstacle clearance altitude, increasing the risk of controlled flight into terrain. The crew's limited IFR experience may have contributed to poor interpretation of IFR procedures.
- Non-compliance with communications procedures in a mandatory frequency area created a situation where pilots of both aircraft had poor knowledge of each other's positions, increasing collision risk.
- The pilot-in-command monitored approach (PICMA) procedure required calls by the pilot not flying when deviating from tolerances but lacked a call for approaching steep bank.
- Transfer of controls was not carried out as per SOPs; the transfer at the co-pilot's request may have taken the pilot-in-command by surprise.
- Despite limited IFR experience in a multi-crew environment, the two pilots were paired. Though they received crew resource management training, they had little multi-crew experience.
- The emergency locator transmitter activated but had limited transmission due to circuit board damage.
- The Chibougamau/Chapais airport lacks aircraft rescue and firefighting services; the fire station is 23 kilometers away, causing a 26-minute response time.
- The standard checklist did not reference the enhanced ground proximity warning system, so its activation was not verified before departure.