History of the Flight
The crew of Boeing 727-200, registration N12305, operated a cargo flight from Brussels and conducted an NDB approach to Runway 27 at East Midlands Airport. The 1050 UTC METAR, issued about 20 minutes prior to the approach, reported surface wind 210°/22–33 kt, visibility 8,000 metres in light rain, broken cloud at 2,700 feet, overcast at 8,000 feet, temperature +8°C, dewpoint 5°C, and QNH 997 mb. Runway resurfacing work was in progress, creating a sterile area from near the Runway 27 threshold adjacent to taxiway 'W', which reduced the Landing Distance Available (LDA) to 1,600 metres. The aircraft had to overfly the work area and touch down beyond the displaced threshold. A supplement to the UK AIP detailing the restrictions had been issued in September 1999.
The commander stated that after establishing visual contact, he used the Precision Approach Path Indicators (PAPIs) to maintain the glide slope. On short finals, gusty wind conditions caused the aircraft to descend to show three red lights and one white light. A high sink rate developed; corrective action was taken, but the aircraft landed heavily on what the crew believed was the active runway side of the displaced threshold.
The aerodrome controller reported that the crew initially contacted him while still under Manchester Control to check surface wind. The aircraft transferred to his control at about 6 nm on finals. He confirmed that the first half of the runway was sterile and provided several instantaneous wind readings. He observed the aircraft crossing the sterile area at approximately 30 feet before touching down heavily at the start of the declared landing distance. A crew of an aircraft waiting for departure also saw the touchdown and later reported that a collision may have occurred between the landing Boeing 727 and contractor's equipment within the sterile area.
After the incident, the duty ATC watch supervisor conducted a runway inspection, which showed evidence of a possible tailscrape, heavy landing, damage to a sandbag, and part of the approach lights within the 210-metre sterile area prior to the displaced threshold. The supervisor noted that during a later conversation, the commander said he was aware of the tailstrike.
Runway Restrictions
Supplement S39-40/1999 to the UK AIP, published on 1 September 1999, detailed the runway resurfacing work at East Midlands Airport. It specified the timetable of works, operational plans with declared runway distances, revised visibility and RVR minima, revised Obstacle Clearance Altitudes (OCAs) and Heights (OCHs), and associated ATIS information. Annex B provided diagrammatic representations of work areas. The airport also provided 3D pictures of all operational plans and faxed the next day's proposed plan to operators.
The ATIS in force at the time stated: "OPS PLAN 12 IN FORCE - ONLY 210 METRES OF LOW INTENSITY APPROACH LIGHTS AVAILABLE". The day after the accident, the ATIS message was updated to specify the work in progress and the use of the temporary threshold and PAPIs.
Flight Recorder Data
The 25-hour Flight Data Recorder (FDR) provided recorded information, but the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) had been overwritten during subsequent flights. Contrary to the commander's recollection, FDR data showed that during the latter stages of the approach, airspeed remained relatively constant between 140 and 150 kt as the aircraft descended at about 800 ft/min. At just above 100 feet agl, the aircraft started to pitch up, reaching 3° nose up by about 60 feet agl. The pilot then pitched the aircraft down by 2° and closed the power levers.
The aircraft maintained this pitch attitude for a second, and airspeed began to decay from 141 kt. Pitch attitude then rapidly increased over 1.75 seconds, culminating in touchdown with a pitch attitude of 7.2° nose up, airspeed of 131 kt, and a normal acceleration of 1.38G. No evidence of windshear or sudden altitude loss was found in the FDR parameters during the final phase.
Federal Aviation Regulations
The AAIB requested FDR documentation from the operator but received none. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had also been unable to acquire similar documentation in an earlier incident involving the same company. Consequently, the limited parameters quoted were derived from general conversion algorithms for this FDR type, not specific to the aircraft, allowing small datum offsets. Some parameters were unrecoverable due to the missing documentation.
Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121.343(j) requires a correlation between recorded and measured values with sufficient correlation points, and that documentation for converting recorded data to engineering units be maintained by the certificate holder. As the aircraft operated under FARs, these documentation deficiencies were referred to the FAA for further investigation, with the UK CAA also informed.