Flight Details
The aircraft departed at 0445 on a refueling mission as part of Operation Headstart, a 42nd Bomb Wing operation demonstrating the airborne nuclear alert concept with B-52 aircraft for the Strategic Air Command. Prior to takeoff, the crew was informed of a no-notice Standardization Board evaluation, resulting in the addition of an Instructor Pilot, Instructor Navigator, and Instructor Boom Operator to the normal crew of four.
Accident Sequence
Upon returning to the Loring AFB area, the aircraft was cleared for a Ground Controlled Approach from the south for a touch-and-go landing. It touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway, applied power, and became airborne near the 7,000-foot mark. Due to the aircraft's weight, air temperature, and the forces involved in the touch-and-go maneuver, the pilot achieved liftoff in a condition where a 35-knot gap existed between adequate lift for takeoff and sufficient airflow over the ailerons for roll authority. The aircraft then rolled to the right, striking the Number 4 engine. The impact caused fuel control unit damage, leading to engine failure and jamming the right aileron in a 5-degree up position. The aircraft assumed a nose-high, right-wing-low attitude and cartwheeled into woods approximately 1,000 feet from the runway, breaking into several major sections and catching fire.
Injuries and Survivors
The Instructor Navigator and Instructor Boom Operator were able to egress the burning wreckage. However, the Instructor Navigator succumbed to burn injuries several weeks later. The crew consisted of pilot Captain John Eifollla, copilot 1st Lieutenant Donald Gladding, navigator Major John Brown, instructor pilot Captain Bernard Morgan, instructor navigator Captain Herman Dosenbach, boom operator Technical Sergeant Ronald Champion, and instructor boom operator Technical Sergeant Charles Holsclaw.
Probable Cause
The investigation cited issues with the KC-135A Flight Manual that did not address the "window" in which the aircraft could become airborne during a touch-and-go without roll control, the pilot's inability to take proper action to deal with the loss of Number 4 engine thrust, and the Instructor Pilot not occupying a front seat with access to controls during a touch-and-go landing as required by SAC regulations.