Synopsis
On 20 September 2024, at approximately 07:30 local time, a Cessna C550, registration YV3226, operating a private flight from Maiquetía, Venezuela (SVMI) to San Antonio, Venezuela (SVSA), inadvertently landed on runway 16 of Camilo Daza Airport (SKCC) in Cúcuta, Colombia, rather than its assigned runway at San Antonio. The aircraft was not authorized to use that runway and had not established communication with the relevant air traffic control frequencies. No injuries to persons or damage to aircraft or infrastructure were reported.
Flight Narrative
The Cessna C550 was conducting a visual descent toward the CUC VOR and requested a visual approach to runway 17 at San Antonio Airport (SVSA) with left traffic. Air traffic control at SVSA approved the request and instructed the crew to report on final for runway 17.
Meanwhile, at the neighboring Camilo Daza Airport, an ATR42 (registration HK5331) operating a scheduled passenger flight was positioned on runway 34, awaiting departure clearance. The approach controller at Camilo Daza observed on an ADS display that the Cessna C550 was approaching the threshold of runway 16 at Camilo Daza without having been assigned that runway and without having made contact on either the Cúcuta approach frequency or the Camilo Daza tower frequency. The controller alerted the tower about the Cessna's position.
The crew of the ATR42, noticing the Cessna approaching head-on toward runway 16, executed an evasive maneuver by exiting the runway and moving onto a nearby holding point behind the threshold.
The Cessna C550 landed on runway 16 at Camilo Daza without ATC authorization and without the runway having been assigned. After landing, it vacated the runway via taxiway B and proceeded to the apron.
Aftermath
Field investigation was conducted by the Dirección Técnica de Investigación de Accidentes (DIACC) in coordination with Camilo Daza airport administration. The investigation team collected evidence including the pilot-in-command's handwritten report, crew flight documents, photographic records, ATS records, flight plan, ATC signal logs, the ATR42 crew report, a Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) from the ATR42 operator, and METAR weather information for Camilo Daza.
Preliminary Findings
The investigation is ongoing. Pending tasks include analysis of human factors, crew documentation review, interviews with the crew and ATC personnel, flight planning factors, review of ATC recordings and other ATS records, analysis of meteorological conditions, and review of aircraft documentation.