Incident Overview
At 14:01 on August 9, 2015, a pilot and a contracted ferry flight pilot departed Akureyri Airport in Iceland aboard a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver, registration N610LC. The flight was conducted under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) with the intention of ferrying the aircraft to Keflavik Airport for eventual sale in Minneapolis/St. Paul, United States.
Flight Path and Weather Encounter
The aircraft initially flew north from Akureyri through Eyjafjörður, over Þelamörk, and then into Öxnadalur valley. Due to a low cloud ceiling, VFR flight over the Öxnadalsheiði ridge was not possible. The pilots turned around at the head of Öxnadalur and proceeded toward Staðartunguháls ridge, then toward Hörgárdalsheiði at the head of Hörgárdalur valley. There, the cloud base blocked passage over the heath, prompting another turn. The pilots then attempted to fly around the Tröllaskagi peninsula per their backup plan, but upon reaching Staðartunguháls ridge again, they observed a break in the cloud cover over Barkárdalur valley. A spontaneous decision was made to enter Barkárdalur.
Terrain and Crash
Barkárdalur is a long, narrow valley flanked by mountains 3,000 to 4,500 feet high, with a mountain passage at approximately 3,900 feet at its head. About 45 minutes after takeoff, the aircraft crashed at an elevation of 2,260 feet near the valley head. The pilot sustained severe injuries, and the ferry flight pilot was fatally injured in a post-crash fire.
Official Findings
The investigation identified several causes and contributing factors. The aircraft was well above its maximum gross weight, significantly degrading performance. VFR flight was conducted with knowledge of instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) along the planned route. The pilots turned back twice before entering IMC but crashed during a third attempted turn. Favorable weather for the subsequent leg on August 10 may have motivated the pilots to proceed despite poor conditions on August 9. The geometry of Barkárdalur—its narrow width and rapidly rising floor—was not properly accounted for. Contributing factors included inadequate planning and weight-and-balance calculations, spontaneous decision-making, failure to brief fuel additions, potential overconfidence from a previous ferry permit, continuation bias, loss of situational awareness, and likely severe carburetor icing.