Incident Overview
On December 13, 2006, a Bell UH-1D helicopter operated by an Ecuadorian company crashed while conducting external load operations in the Pitirishca sector, located northeast of Kilometer 60 on the Puyo-Macas road. The aircraft had arrived at Río Amazonas Airport the previous day from Macas to begin a series of timber transport flights using a long sling.
Sequence of Events
The helicopter departed Río Amazonas Airport at 14:46 UTC (09:46 local time) and reported no issues upon reaching Pitirishca at 15:05 UTC. This was the final communication from the aircraft. During that day, the crew had completed twelve successful flights without incident. While approaching the designated drop-off point for the thirteenth flight, the helicopter experienced a sudden bank to the right. The suspended timber load became unstable and began swinging pendularly.
The mechanic aboard, who was visually monitoring the cargo, warned the pilot not to descend, to reduce speed, and to maintain altitude. However, the aircraft lost control and descended until the cargo struck the treetops. The load then impacted the ground, dragged for 25 meters, and became anchored in a rectangular pit of muddy terrain. This friction halted the forward movement of the helicopter, causing it to fall abruptly and impact the ground approximately 50 meters further ahead, near the intended drop zone.
Personnel and Injuries
The aircraft was crewed by a pilot, a co-pilot, and a mechanic. All three individuals survived the accident with no reported injuries. The pilot was a 45-year-old Ecuadorian national with a total flight time of 2,891 hours and 158 hours on the Bell UH-1D. The co-pilot was a 56-year-old Ecuadorian national with over 5,000 total flight hours. The mechanic served as the load master, responsible for visually controlling cargo stability.
Aircraft Condition and Maintenance
The helicopter sustained severe damage due to the impact forces. Records indicated the airframe had accumulated 7,262.4 hours of service. The Lycoming-Honeywell T53-L-13B engine had 5,540.6 hours since new. Notably, the investigation found that the company lacked an approved maintenance program from the Civil Aviation Directorate. Additionally, there were no records proving that the crew or load master had received recurrent training for external load operations with long slings as required by regulations. The aircraft's airworthiness certificate was valid but noted to be issued based on a Constitutional Court resolution.