29 fatalities

Avianca Flight 739 Accident (HK-161)

Mt Tajumbina, ColombiaFlight

On December 24, 1966, a Douglas C-47 Skytrain (DC-3) (registration HK-161) operated by Avianca was involved in an aviation accident near Mt Tajumbina, Colombia in flight. 29 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Pilot error consisting of inflight indiscipline and rash imprudence by the pilot-in-command, including failure to use the regulation rest period, consuming alcoholic drinks before flying, not following the recommended route, reporting positions that did not… This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-12Data APIEditorial standards

Avianca Flight 739, a domestic flight from Bogotá to Pasto, crashed on 24 December 1966 after the pilot continued visual flight in IFR conditions. All 29 occupants were killed.

Flight Details and Departure Delay Flight 739 was a scheduled domestic service operating from Bogotá-El Dorado Airport to Pasta-Cano Airport. The flight was originally scheduled to depart Bogotá at 0615 local time. However, when the crew reported to the Avianca operations office at 0550, they were informed that El Dorado Airport was closed due to thick fog. The airport reopened to operations at 0750. ## Taxiing and Takeoff At approximately 0830, Flight 739 was observed taxiing and entering the runway system without receiving a clearance. The flight was subsequently given instructions for Runway 30, but further transmissions on 121.9 mc/s were not acknowledged. The flight was later contacted on 118.1 mc/s, where the pilot stated he had confused instructions with those given to another aircraft. Takeoff was made on Runway 10. As the aircraft passed over the threshold of Runway 12, it commenced a very steep left turn in a nose-high attitude. Recovery was effected, and the aircraft departed at 0838 on a VFR flight plan. ## En Route Communications After takeoff and climb, the flight left the Bogotá tower frequency and contacted Bogotá Control and Route Control on 5589 Kc/s. Position reports were received as follows: 12,500 ft over Guataqui at 0842; over El Paso at 0902; over Tuluá at 0924; 8,500 ft over Cali at 0942; and 8,500 ft over Santander at 0948, estimating Dos Rios at 1014. No position report for Dos Rios was received. The Tuluá position report was transmitted to Cali as: “Tuluá 0922 descending to 8,500, estimating Cali 0942.” Because the message was very weak, the flight was requested to confirm its departure and position. It reported on route frequency 5476.5 KC/S its departure as 0825/38. The flight was then requested to change to VHF frequency 119.1 for radio contact when approaching Cali. It did so, but as its signals were not heard, it returned to the route frequency, stating it would remain on that frequency since it had not been able to establish contact on the VHF frequency. ## Search and Recovery At 1030, Cali requested information on the flight from Pasto, which reported that the flight had not arrived and there was no information about it. From 1030 onward, the aircraft was called on all available frequencies, but no reply was received. An alert phase was declared at 1100, followed by a distress phase at 1125. The wreckage was found on 3 January 1967 after 11 days of searching. The aircraft had crashed and caught fire at an elevation of approximately 11,600 ft on the southern slopes of Tajumbina Peak (elevation 13,572 ft) in the El Descanse Police Inspectorate. The accident site coordinates were 1° 20' 30'' N 76° 47' 30'' W. The accident occurred at approximately 0956 on 24 December 1966. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire, and all 29 occupants were killed.

Probable cause

Pilot error consisting of inflight indiscipline and rash imprudence by the pilot-in-command, including failure to use the regulation rest period, consuming alcoholic drinks before flying, not following the recommended route, reporting positions that did not correspond to reality, continuing visual flight in unfavorable IFR conditions, and flying below the minimum safety altitude for visual flying. A possible contributory cause was inadequate supervision by the airline, consisting of a lack of control over the flight crews.