No fatalities

2009-05-06: Douglas DC-10 (N139WA) — World Airways — Baltimore-Washington-Thurgood Marshall, United States of America

Baltimore-Washington-Thurgood Marshall, United States of AmericaLanding (descent or approach)

On May 6, 2009, a Douglas DC-10 (registration N139WA) operated by World Airways was involved in an aviation accident near Baltimore-Washington-Thurgood Marshall, United States of America during landing or approach. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The captain’s inappropriate control inputs following a firm landing, resulting in two hard nose-gear impacts before executing a go-around. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 3 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781196755Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered N139WA
Aircraft registered N139WA. Photo: PlanespotterA320 / CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

During a visual approach with ILS backup, a three-engine aircraft experienced a firm landing, leading to a bounce and two hard nose gear impacts before a successful go-around. Fatigue and fragmented training likely affected the captain's performance.

Approach and Landing

The flight was conducting a straight-in approach in visual meteorological conditions, supported by an instrument landing system. The approach was stable at 500 feet above touchdown. The initial touchdown was firm, causing the main landing gear to rebound and possibly bounce off the runway.

Sequence of Events Following Touchdown

After the bounce, control column input and possibly momentum from the touchdown resulted in a rapid pitch down, leading to a hard nose gear impact with the runway. Wing spoilers likely did not deploy due to the main gear bounce, throttle position, or both. Following the nose gear impact, the airplane pitched up as expected, and the column was held in a slightly forward position. Airspeed rapidly decayed, and engine power began to increase as the pitch reversed to a downward motion for a second time.

Second Nose Gear Strike and Go-Around

One crewmember, likely the first officer, called out "flare flare," and the control column recorded a rapid nose-up input, followed by a rapid nose-down input. The nose gear struck the runway very hard again, likely causing the majority of the damage at that point. After the second impact, column inputs stabilized at a slightly nose-up command, power was set on all three engines, and the go-around was successfully executed.

Possible Contributing Factors

A slight lag in power increase on engine number 3 may have contributed to the nose-down motion leading to the second nose gear impact, although the large forward (airplane nose down) column movement appears to be a much more significant contributor. It is unclear why the engine was slower to increase; throttle lever angle was not recorded. The engine operated as expected for all other phases, so it is possible the pilot did not advance the number 3 throttle concurrently with the others.

Pilot Condition and Training

The captain's flight and duty schedule complied with Federal Aviation regulations but included a demanding 10-day trip with multiple time zone crossings and long duty periods. He reported difficulties sleeping prior to the incident leg and was likely further affected by a digestive system upset during the flight. It is likely that his performance was degraded by fatigue and some degree of physical discomfort from a short-term illness. The captain had recently completed upgrade training to the DC-10, having previously been an MD-11 first officer. This training was fragmented over approximately ten months and, while in accordance with regulations, may have adversely affected his consolidation of skills and experience.

Probable cause

The captain’s inappropriate control inputs following a firm landing, resulting in two hard nose-gear impacts before executing a go-around. Contributing to the inappropriate control inputs was the captain’s fatigue and physical discomfort; and a possible lack of practical consolidation of skills and experience due to a protracted and fragmented training period.