52 fatalities

1961-03-28: Ilyushin II-18 (OK-OAD) — CSA Czech Airlines - Československé Státní Aerolinie — Forchheim, Germany

Forchheim, GermanyFlight

On March 28, 1961, an Ilyushin II-18 (registration OK-OAD) operated by CSA Czech Airlines - Československé Státní Aerolinie was involved in an aviation accident near Forchheim, Germany in flight. 52 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: In the light of the investigations undertaken, it is probable that the accident occurred in one of the following ways, although the possibility of other causes cannot be ruled out: a) Forced descent causing the aircraft to exceed the structural stress factor… This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781245840Data APIEditorial standards

A four-engine aircraft disappeared from radar at 2009LT while cruising at 20,000 feet over Bavaria and crashed near Forchheim. All 52 occupants died. The official probable cause lists several possibilities including instrument failure or pilot incapacitation.

Accident Description

While cruising at an altitude of 20,000 feet over Bavaria, a four-engine aircraft disappeared from radar screens at 2009LT. The aircraft subsequently crashed in a field near Forchheim, north of Nuremberg. The crew was unable to send any distress call prior to the impact. The airplane disintegrated on impact, and all 52 occupants were killed.

Probable Cause

The official investigation findings state that the accident probably occurred in one of two ways, though other causes could not be ruled out. The first possibility is a forced descent causing the aircraft to exceed structural stress limits during the approach maneuver or pull-out, due to: (1) a defect in an artificial horizon or an electric instrument of equal importance leading to an uncontrollable flight position; (2) unnoticed over-control of the electrical rudder or aileron trim adjustment while the autopilot was operating, with resulting flight movements after autopilot disconnection (the autopilot lacked a trim servo-indicator for excessive trim warnings); or (3) physical incapacity of one or both pilots. The second possibility is an intentional descent due to smoke, fire, or a similar emergency, during which structural stress limits were exceeded in the approach maneuver or pull-out.