2023 McDonnell Douglas DC-9-83 aborted takeoff at Puerto Ordaz (YV3465)

Incident Overview and Aircraft Details On March 9, 2023, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-83, registration YV3465, serial number 49452, operated by Líneas Aéreas de Servicios Ejecutivo Regional (LASER), C.A., filed a flight plan from the Aeropuerto Internacional “Manuel Carlos Piar” (SVPR) in Puerto Ordaz, Estado Bolívar, to the Aeropuerto Internacional “Simón Bolívar” in Maiquetía, Estado La Guaira. The aircraft was powered by two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-217C turbofan engines, each with a maximum thrust of 20,850 lb, and had a maximum takeoff weight of 130,000 lb (59,000 kg). At 14:38 UTC, the aircraft began its takeoff roll on runway 08 at SVPR with 96 people on board: six cabin crew, 86 passengers, two children, one extra person, and one infant. The flight carried 18,800 lb of fuel, with an estimated en-route time of one hour and three hours of endurance. ## Takeoff Roll and Engine Anomaly During the takeoff roll, the crew reported a loud noise accompanied by vibrations and an abnormal lateral movement to the right. The pilot observed erratic indications on the engine pressure ratio (EPR) and N1 (low-pressure compressor tachometer), which were presumed to be caused by a compressor stall in the right engine. The crew immediately applied the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) procedures and decided to abort the takeoff. The pilot in command contacted the tower controller to request information about the aircraft’s external condition. The controller reported observing black smoke coming from the right engine. The pilot checked the instrument panel and decided to shut down the right engine. After confirming there was no fire in the engine, the crew returned to platform 2 at Puerto Ordaz airport, and the passengers disembarked without incident. All occupants were unharmed, and the aircraft sustained substantial damage to the right engine. ## Investigation and Technical Findings The investigation, designated as Expediente 015/2023, was in its development and execution phase at the time of the preliminary report. Activities included a 360-degree photographic record of the aircraft, interviews with the pilot and first officer, and the collection of various documents, including licenses, medical certificates, flight logs, and maintenance records. A visual inspection of the right engine confirmed a stall, with observed damage to the low-pressure turbine. A borescope inspection, conducted in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 72-0000 and Engine Manual AMM 72-00-00, found no damage to the fan blades, compressor blades (C-6, C-7, C-13), combustion chamber No. 4, NGVs, or turbine blades (T-1, T-2, T-4). An exterior inspection of the secondary flow revealed that the fan rear outer duct with sound-absorbing liner was detached by 50% of its total size. The investigation was ongoing, with the engine scheduled to be sent to a repair organization to determine the root cause of the incident. ## Crew and Operational Context The pilot in command, aged 48, held a valid medical certificate and Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) license issued by the Instituto Nacional de Aeronáutica Civil (INAC), with 600 hours as pilot in command on the involved model and 6,000 total hours. The first officer, aged 54, held a valid medical certificate and Commercial Pilot license issued by INAC, with 1,300 hours as first officer on the involved model and 2,500 total hours. The aircraft was airworthy at the time of the incident, according to its valid airworthiness certificate (Control No. 014232) issued by the state of registration. The last preventive and scheduled maintenance was performed by OMAC-N° 475, Línea Aérea Servicios Ejecutivos Regional, C.A., located at the Aeropuerto Internacional “Simón Bolívar” in Maiquetía. Meteorological conditions at SVPR were reported as unlimited visibility and generally good weather throughout the day. ## Notifications and International Cooperation In accordance with Chapter 4 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, notifications were sent to the relevant states. The incident was reported to the ICAO’s ADREP system, and notifications were sent to the United States, the state of design and manufacture, via email. The NTSB, as the accident investigation authority for the state of design and manufacture, responded to the notification and assigned an accredited representative. The regional cooperation mechanism AIG (ARCM) was also notified.