Flight Summary
On 31 March 2018, a Grumman G164, registration LV-CSU, operated by a private owner, was flown by a pilot who was a member of the Aero Club de Intendente Alvear. The aircraft had been borrowed for display at an air festival held at that club. As weather conditions deteriorated with strong winds and gusts, the pilot decided to relocate the aircraft to the private Azcarate Irastorza aerodrome in the same locality for hangar storage.
At approximately 21:30 UTC, the aircraft departed from Intendente Alvear (IAL) and landed at the private aerodrome on runway 36. After a landing roll of about 450 meters, the pilot lost directional control. The aircraft veered to the right, exited the runway, and struck a perimeter fence 15 meters from the runway edge. The tail skid and left wing sustained significant damage. The accident occurred in daylight under strong winds with gusts. Notification to the investigating authority (JIAAC) was made 24 hours after the event.
Investigation Findings
Investigators arrived after the aircraft had been moved to a hangar area without authorization. Rain on the day after the accident prevented identification of touchdown marks. A measured estimate of the landing roll was based on the pilot’s account. No infrastructure defects were found on the runway surface, but the aerodrome’s windsock was under repair and unavailable at the time.
The aircraft’s damage was consistent with a lateral runway excursion. Fuel samples from both tanks (approximately 120 liters total) were tested at the Laboratorio de Ensayos de Materiales de El Palomar. The fuel was identified as automotive gasoline (naphtha super) containing solid contaminants (fibers and silica) and small amounts of synthetic sealant-like material, which violates Argentine advisory circular CA N°20-139 prohibiting automotive gasoline in aircraft engines.
The owner did not possess the aircraft’s certificate of registration, airworthiness certificate, or FAA Form 337. The national aviation authority (ANAC) confirmed that it had not received any request for an airworthiness certificate and had not issued one. The registration certificate was issued on 23 January 2013. The aircraft’s logbooks, original from its import in 2012, contained no evidence of any inspections having been performed up to the accident date.
No technical failures were identified in the engine or flight controls. The investigation focused on operational factors. Weather conditions at the time were thunderstorms without precipitation and wind from 180° at 15 knots with gusts to 30 knots. Landing on runway 36 resulted in a tailwind that exceeded the limits specified in the aircraft’s flight manual, adversely affecting directional control during the landing roll. The pilot was familiar with the aerodrome.
Conclusions
The accident factors identified were: (1) loss of directional control during the landing roll due to a tailwind exceeding the flight manual limits, and (2) the aircraft’s lack of airworthiness due to the absence of required maintenance and a valid airworthiness certificate.