Factual Information
On 28 March 2019, a Laviasa PA-25-260 aircraft, registration LV-ZOG, operated by Spry Land S.A., was conducting aerial work operations from a temporary field at Rayo Cortado, Córdoba. The aircraft took off at 19:20 UTC for a series of consecutive flights. After completing the twelfth flight, the engine stopped suddenly at an altitude of approximately 20 meters. Unable to reach the temporary field, the pilot performed an emergency landing in a corn field. The aircraft touched down at low speed and came to a stop after traveling 10 meters on a heading of 090°. The aircraft sustained minor damage. The accident occurred during daylight in good weather conditions. There were no injuries to the pilot, who was the sole occupant.
Investigation
The investigation, initiated by the then JIAAC after media reports (the accident was not reported by the operator), found that the aircraft had departed with 100 liters of fuel from its base near Santa Elena. It performed six consecutive flights of 12 minutes each before returning for refueling. Between the sixth and seventh flights, the pilot refueled the aircraft, estimating 100 to 110 liters added, though the exact amount could not be determined. The aircraft was equipped with a direct float-type fuel quantity indicator in the cockpit, which was functional but did not provide precise readings. The fuel delivery system consisted of a tanker and an electric pump without a flowmeter, so refueling was done by estimation.
After the refueling, the pilot flew five more flights of 12 minutes and one flight of 10 minutes, totaling 70 minutes of flight time before the engine stopped. Based on an estimated fuel consumption of 60 liters per hour for the type of operation, approximately 70 liters would have been consumed from the point of the last refueling to the accident. The aircraft's single fuel tank had a total capacity of 136 liters, of which 7.6 liters were unusable. Inspection of the fuel system revealed no leaks or malfunctions.
Analysis
The investigation concluded that the engine stopped due to fuel exhaustion. Given the estimated fuel consumption and the inability to confirm the exact amount of fuel loaded, it was determined that the aircraft had been refueled with less fuel than necessary to complete the planned operation. The float-type fuel indicator, while operational, did not provide an accurate reading, and the lack of a flowmeter on the refueling equipment contributed to the uncertainty in fuel quantity.
Conclusions
The following factors were identified as related to the accident:
- The pilot and support personnel were unable to determine the exact fuel load before the flight sequence that ended in the accident.
- The amount of fuel loaded was less than that required to complete the operation.
- The cockpit fuel quantity indicator did not provide a precise reading.
- The engine stopped due to lack of fuel.
Additional safety risk factors noted:
- The accident was not reported in a timely manner.
- The aircraft wreckage was not preserved.