2 fatalities

2009-07-19: Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class) (C-GUZZ) — Underhill Aviation — Kamsack, Canada

Kamsack, CanadaTakeoff (climb)

On July 19, 2009, a Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class) (registration C-GUZZ) operated by Underhill Aviation was involved in an aviation accident near Kamsack, Canada during takeoff. 2 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot was unable to maintain aircraft control after takeoff for undetermined reasons and the aircraft rolled to the left and collided with terrain. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781196632Data APIEditorial standards

Aircraft on IFR flight from Kamsack to Saskatoon rolled left after takeoff and collided with terrain. Two fatalities, two seriously injured. Investigation finds pilot lost control for undetermined reasons.

Accident Overview

The aircraft departed Kamsack, Saskatchewan, on an instrument flight rules flight to Saskatoon. The pilot and three passengers were on board. During takeoff from runway 34, the aircraft began rolling to the left. It initially climbed, then descended in a steep left bank and collided with terrain approximately 200 feet to the left of the runway. A post-impact fire ignited immediately. The accident occurred during evening civil twilight at 2124 Central Standard Time.

Injuries and Damage

The pilot and one passenger sustained fatal injuries. Two passengers survived with serious injuries and evacuated from the burning wreckage. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact forces and the subsequent post-impact fire.

Probable Cause

The investigation determined that the pilot was unable to maintain aircraft control after takeoff for undetermined reasons, and the aircraft rolled to the left and collided with terrain.

Additional Investigation Findings

  • Due to the complete destruction of the surrounding structure, restriction to aileron cable movement prior to impact could not be determined.
  • The manufacturer issued a service bulletin to regularly inspect and lubricate the stainless steel cables. However, because the bulletin was not part of an airworthiness directive and was not considered mandatory, it was not carried out on an ongoing basis. It is likely that the recommended maintenance action has not been carried out on other affected aircraft at the 100-hour or annual frequency recommended in FAA SAIB CE-01-30.
  • The use of the available three-point restraint systems likely prevented the two survivors from being incapacitated, enabling them to evacuate from the burning wreckage.