Night Approach Accident at Dunkeswell Aerodrome (N961JM)

Flight Background and Departure Conditions The pilot was conducting an IFR flight from Chambery, France, to Dunkeswell Aerodrome, with Exeter Airport designated as the diversion. Before departure, the pilot reviewed available TAFs and METARs for Exeter and nearby airfields and judged the conditions suitable. Around 1530 hrs, the pilot also spoke with a friend, a commercial pilot living near Dunkeswell, who estimated the cloud base at approximately 1,500 feet. The aircraft departed Chambery at 1605 hrs. Apart from some airframe icing on departure, the transit at FL270 was uneventful. ## Descent and Approach Setup Approaching the south coast of England, the aircraft was descended to FL60 and left controlled airspace at Southampton in good VMC, with the lights along the south coast clearly visible. At 1720 hrs, the weather at Exeter was: surface wind 130°/08 kt, varying between 110° and 170°; visibility 6,000 metres; cloud SCT 005, BKN 012; temperature +9°C; dew point +8°C; QNH 1011 mb. With about 50 miles remaining to the destination, the pilot attempted to contact Dunkeswell Radio but received no reply and assumed the airfield had closed for the night. The lights of Dunkeswell village and an industrial site at the north-eastern edge of the aerodrome were visible, though they appeared milky, as if seen through scattered mist pockets. The aircraft was descended to 2,600 feet on the Exeter QNH. The main altimeter was set to the Dunkeswell QFE by subtracting 31 mb from the Exeter QNH to account for the aerodrome’s 850-foot elevation. The pilot used two GPS navigation systems programmed to provide centreline information for Runway 23 on a CDI scale of 0.3 nm for full deflection. Although Dunkeswell had no runway lighting, the pilot had placed white reflective panels on the right edge of Runway 23. When illuminated by the aircraft’s landing light, these panels were intended to show the right-hand edge of the runway and indicate the touchdown zone. The panels measured 18 cm by 9.5 cm and were mounted vertically on low, black plastic supports. The threshold for Runway 23 was displaced 290 metres from the road running along the northern aerodrome boundary, and the first reflector was 220 metres beyond the displaced threshold. The reflectors were positioned over a distance of 460 metres, with spacing between them varying from 15 to 49 metres. The white centreline markings would also have been visible in the landing light once the aircraft was low enough. The end of the 46-metre-wide runway was 280 metres from the last reflector. The pilot had made many previous night approaches and landings to Runway 23 using similar visual references. ## Final Approach and Impact The pilot identified the lights of the industrial site earlier than expected, at six miles, while maintaining 2,600 feet on the Exeter QNH. He cancelled his radar service from Exeter, which had also provided ranges and bearings from Dunkeswell, and made blind transmissions on the Dunkeswell Radio frequency regarding his position and intentions. After commencing the final approach, the pilot noticed scattered cloud near the approach path. At about 2.5 nm from the runway threshold and approximately 800 feet agl, the pilot saw a mist pocket ahead and decided to initiate a go-around and divert to Exeter. At that point, the aircraft had the second stage of flap lowered, the landing gear down, and the airspeed reducing through 135 kt, with all three landing lights selected ON. The pilot increased power and began a climb, but became visual with the runway again, so he reduced power and resumed the approach. A high rate of descent developed, and the radio altimeters’ automatic 50-foot audio warning sounded. The pilot began to increase engine power but was too late to prevent a severe impact with terrain that followed almost immediately. The aircraft’s wings were torn off as it passed between two trees, and the fuselage continued across a grass field, remaining upright until it came to a stop. ## Post-Impact Actions The passenger immediately vacated the aircraft through the normal exit in the passenger cabin and then returned to assist the pilot. After turning off the aircraft’s electrical and fuel systems, the pilot also left through the normal exit. A leak developed from the oxygen system, which had been disrupted in the accident, and the pilot was unable to remove the fire extinguisher from its stowage because of airframe deformation. He contacted Exeter ATC using a mobile telephone to report the accident, and they initiated the emergency services response.