What happened
On December 28, 1998, at 08:47 PM, an EMB-145ER, registration PT-SPE, was performing flight SL 310 from Rio de Janeiro to Curitiba, with a scheduled stop in Campinas. The aircraft was carrying 36 passengers and 4 crew members.
During the approach to runway 15 at Afonso Pena Airport (SBCT), the airport was operating under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) with a ceiling of approximately 300 feet. While on the final approach, the aircraft's vertical descent rate increased significantly. Just before touchdown, the pilot increased the pitch angle to approximately 13 degrees while reducing engine power to idle. This resulted in a touchdown with a vertical descent rate of approximately 1,800 feet per minute, far exceeding the design limits.
The impact caused extensive structural damage, including deformation of the upper and lower rear fuselage, buckling of the first and second fuselage stages, and damage to the left landing gear strut. Following the heavy impact, the crew taxied the aircraft to taxiway India, brought it to a stop, and initiated an emergency evacuation. During the evacuation, an APU fire alarm was activated, and smoke entered the passenger cabin, though the crew successfully extinguished the fire.
The investigation
CENIPA investigators analyzed the aircraft's flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR), as well as technical reports from Embraer. The investigation focused on the aircraft's aerodynamic behavior, the landing gear's structural response, and the crew's performance.
Technical analysis by Embraer determined that the vertical impact velocity was approximately 17 ft/s to cause the observed damage, which is 70% above the design limit of 10 ft/s. FDR data indicated an even higher vertical speed of approximately 30 ft/s at the moment of impact. The investigation also identified a discrepancy in the FDR's data acquisition frequency for certain parameters.
Regarding the crew, the investigation examined the transition of the pilot flying (PF) from turboprop operations to jet aircraft, noting that the operator had not provided specific jet transition or simulator training. The investigation also reviewed the crew's coordination and adherence to standard operating procedures during the final approach.
Findings
- Inadequate flight control application: The pilot flying failed to apply sufficient engine power at the appropriate time to arrest the high sink rate.
- Improper crew coordination: The pilot flying did not execute necessary corrections, and the pilot not flying (PNF), acting as an instructor, failed to intervene effectively or take control when the aircraft left the safe landing envelope.
- Poor judgment: The crew failed to respond to the GPWS "sink rate" warning and did not recognize the point of irreversibility of the unsafe approach.
- Lack of specific training: The pilot flying was in the process of gaining operational experience on jet aircraft without formal jet transition or simulator training, and the company's training program lacked specific instruction on the dangers of "power off" approaches in jets.
- Environmental factors: The transition from IMC to visual conditions led to a deviation from the glide slope and an increased descent rate.