First Approach
The first instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 1 appeared to proceed normally until the first officer, who was the pilot flying, transitioned from instrument references inside the flight deck to outside references. During a postaccident interview, the first officer stated that he expected to see the runway but instead saw “white on white” and a structure with an antenna that was part of the runway environment. The captain, who was the pilot monitoring, reported seeing a tower and called for a go-around. Both flight crewmembers were likely seeing the automated weather observing system wind sensor pole, located about 325 feet to the right of the runway 1 centerline and about 870 feet beyond the runway threshold. Damage to the lightning arrester at the top of the pole was likely due to contact with the accident airplane as it flew over the pole. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), after the go-around the first officer asked if the captain saw the runway lights. The captain responded that she saw the lights but that “it’s really white down there that’s the problem.” Airport personnel stated that snow plowing operations had finished about 10 minutes before the first approach. The CVR recorded discussion about turning on the pilot-controlled runway lights and sounds similar to microphone clicks, but the PQI maintenance foreman stated that the runway lights were not on after the first approach. The investigation could not determine whether the flight crew had turned on the lights during the first approach.
Second Approach
The captain instructed the first officer to remain on instruments during the second approach until the decision altitude of 200 feet above ground level. The second approach proceeded normally with no problems capturing or maintaining the localizer and glideslope. The captain asked airport maintenance personnel to ensure the runway lighting was on, and the foreman replied that the lights were on the high-intensity setting. As the airplane approached the decision altitude, the captain instructed the first officer to disconnect the autopilot. About nine seconds later, at the decision altitude, the captain called, “runway in sight twelve o’clock.” The first officer responded, “I’m stayin’ on the flight director ‘cause I don’t see it yet.” A few seconds later, while the airplane was below 100 feet above ground level, both crewmembers expressed confusion, with the captain stating “what the [expletive]” and the first officer saying “I don’t know what I'm see in’.” Neither called for a go-around. The airplane subsequently impacted the snow-covered grassy area between runway 1 and a parallel taxiway. During a postaccident interview, the first officer stated that, when he transitioned from instruments to outside during the second approach, he again saw “white on white” and blowing snow, and the airplane touched down before he could determine what he was seeing. The maintenance foreman estimated that at the time of the accident, the runway had about 1/8 inch of snow with about 20% to 25% of the runway visible.
Probable Cause
The official probable cause stated: The flight crew’s decision, due to confirmation bias, to continue the descent below the decision altitude when the runway had not been positively identified. Contributing to the accident were: 1) the first officer’s fatigue, which exacerbated his confirmation bias, and 2) the failure of CommutAir pilots who had observed the localizer misalignment to report it to the company and air traffic before the accident.