Incident Details
During the final approach to runway 15, after breaking out of the last cloud layer, the pilot-in-command realized the aircraft was too high on the glide path. Instead of executing a go-around, the captain increased the descent rate to 1,800 feet per minute and continued with an incorrect approach configuration. The aircraft touched down with a positive acceleration of 11 g, causing the fuselage to break in two aft of the wings. The crew continued braking and vacated the runway onto a taxiway before stopping. All 40 occupants evacuated without injury, but the aircraft sustained damage beyond repair.
Probable Cause Findings
The official investigation identified multiple factors contributing to the accident:
- Deficiencies in attention, judgment, and perceptual evaluation of distances and timing were present.
- Qualitative training deficiencies, lack of crew resource management, and low situational awareness were significant contributing factors.
- The pilot flying (PF) used improper piloting technique in combination with speed and rate of descent.
- The assigned instructor lacked specific training for supervising operational experience acquisition, and technical/operational supervision was inadequate.
- The PF had good overall flight experience but limited experience in this aircraft type and was still in the operational experience acquisition phase.
- The pilots did not adequately use available cockpit resources. The PF failed to make necessary trajectory corrections, and the instructor (PNF) did not effectively correct or intervene.
- The crew did not follow the Flight Operations Manual procedure regarding the GPWS warning, which indicated an unsafe condition near touchdown.
- During the IMC approach, the PF varied parameters and remained high on the glideslope. Upon gaining visual conditions, the PF increased the descent rate while the PNF focused on locating the runway and missed the inadequate correction.
- The PF attempted to reduce the descent rate by incorrectly applying engine power (too little, too late). Near the ground, at about 80 feet and idle power, the aircraft maintained a high descent rate of 1,800 ft/min despite pitch adjustments.
- The PNF warned of low speed and high descent rate but did not take or attempt to take control, overestimating the PF's capability.
- The pilots were unaware of the maximum certified descent rate at touchdown and its variation with weight. Use of the autopilot to the MDA could have minimized the glideslope deviation.
Crew Actions
Throughout the approach, the PF failed to properly manage power and descent rate. The PNF, although experienced, lacked awareness of the aircraft's irreversibility point for an unsafe situation and limited corrective actions to verbal warnings. Neither pilot effectively utilized cockpit resources or adhered to standard operating procedures.