On May 24, 2013, a PZL-Mielec AN-2 (registration EX-02015) operated by Valor Air was involved in an aviation accident near Jyl-Kol, Kyrgyzstan in flight. 3 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: In violation of Section 5.1.15 of the Guidelines for Aviation Chemical Works (ACW), the Aircrew Commander (AC) decided to combine the production flight with followed inspection of the new site, taking a representative of the Customer on board. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.
An aircraft conducting a locust fumigation mission hit power cables at about 15 meters altitude near Jyl-Kol, Jalal-Abad Province, crashed, and burned. All three occupants were killed and the aircraft was destroyed.
Accident
The crew was engaged in a fumigation mission against locusts over a plantation near Jyl-Kol in the Jalal-Abad Province. While flying at a height of about 15 metres, the aircraft hit power cables and crashed, bursting into flames. All three occupants were killed and the aircraft was destroyed by the post-crash fire.
Investigation
The investigation identified several procedural violations and deficiencies. The Aircrew Commander decided to combine the production flight with an inspection of a new site, taking a representative of the Customer on board, in violation of Section 5.1.15 of the Guidelines for Aviation Chemical Works. The passenger was seated in the co-pilot seat, prohibited under Section 5 of PPLS. Before the flight, the commander received an indicative weather forecast from the hydro meteorology experts at Osh International Airport. However, a revised weather forecast was not drawn up and the crew did not receive it because the flight control officer did not send actual weather data provided by the crew after take-off, as required by paragraph 8.7.7 of APKR-3. The technology of air traffic controllers' work at Osh International Airport does not include responsibility for transferring information about actual weather obtained from crews to the base aerodrome meteorological office responsible for forecasting weather, and it does not specifically define the actions of air traffic services in obtaining information about an aviation accident. No changes were made in the temperature regime when performing aviation chemical works in accordance with the Guidelines for the Implementation of ACW Technology in Agriculture and Forestry (1980). The portable emergency radio beacon, PARM-406, did not function at the time of the accident. The Statute of Aeronautical Search and Rescue Service of the Kyrgyz Republic has no changes related to its reorganization in 2007.
Probable cause
In violation of Section 5.1.15 of the Guidelines for Aviation Chemical Works (ACW), the Aircrew Commander (AC) decided to combine the production flight with followed inspection of the new site, taking a representative of the Customer on board. In violation of Section 5, PPLS, the passenger was seating in the co-pilot seat and this is prohibited. Before making a decision to operate a flight, the Aircrew Commander received an indicative weather forecast from the hydro meteorology experts of Osh International Airport. The revised weather forecast was not drawn up and the crew did not receive it because the flight control officer did not send an actual weather data provided by the crew after take-off, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 8.7.7, APKR-3 . The technology of air traffic controllers’ work at Osh International Airport does not include responsibility for the transfer of information about the actual weather obtained from the crews to base aerodrome meteorological office responsible for forecasting weather and it does not specifically define the actions of air traffic services in obtaining information about an aviation accident. No changes were made in the temperature regime when performing aviation chemical works in accordance with the Guidelines for the Implementation of ACW technology in Agriculture and Forestry” designed by the Civil Aviation Ministry, USSR, and issued on December 30, 1980, Number 668/Y (these instructions were entered into operation by the order of the Director of the Civil Aviation Department under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications on March 20, 2009, number 188/p in the “List of Legislative Acts Regulating the Civil Aviation Activities of the Kyrgyz Republic”). Portable emergency radio beacon, PARM -406, did not function at the time of the accident. The Statute of Aeronautical Search and Rescue Service of the Kyrgyz Republic has no changes related to its reorganization in 2007.