What happened
On 27 August 2024 at approximately 15:15 local time, a serious diving incident occurred in the Silfra fissure at Þingvellir National Park. A 65-year-old participant, referred to as Diver B, lost consciousness while on the bottom of the fissure during a guided group dive.
The dive was organized by a licensed commercial operator and included three customers (Divers A, B, and C) and one professional divemaster. The participants were paired up: Diver A (74 years old) with Diver B, and Diver C (46 years old) with the divemaster. According to witness accounts, Diver A experienced difficulties early in the dive and surfaced. While Diver C and the divemaster assisted Diver A at the surface, they discovered that Diver B was motionless on the bottom near a rock formation.
The divemaster immediately descended to assist Diver B and brought them to the surface. Other divers present in the water area swam over to help transport the unconscious diver to shore. Emergency services, including a Landhelgisgæslan helicopter, were dispatched to the scene. Diver B was transported to a hospital in Reykjavik, discharged after several days, and subsequently left the country.
The investigation
The Transportation Safety Board of Iceland (RNSA) initiated its investigation only after seeing media reports, as neither the police nor the diving operator had reported the incident to them. RNSA requested information from the police the day after the accident, but the request was not fulfilled until 16 days later. By that time, Diver B had already left Iceland.
RNSA examined the diving equipment of Diver B, excluding the weight belt which remained on the bottom. The pressure cylinder contained sufficient air (105 bar) and functioned correctly. However, RNSA was unable to obtain a dive logbook from the operator, as it did not exist for this specific dive. Additionally, data from the divemaster’s dive computer was no longer available.
RNSA analyzed data from Diver C’s personal dive computer. The dive lasted 36 minutes, with a maximum depth of 12 meters. The profile showed that Diver C surfaced early to assist Diver A and again near the end of the dive. Notably, no safety stop was recorded during the ascent from 12 meters.
Findings
The RNSA concluded that it was not possible to determine the specific cause of Diver B losing consciousness due to insufficient data. The delay in information sharing between authorities and the absence of mandatory technical records (dive logbooks and computer data) significantly hindered the investigation.
According to Landhelgisgæslan, divemasters bear full responsibility for the safety of their clients and must maintain constant supervision. Leaving a client at depth without continuous oversight or clear instructions is considered a serious breach of safety standards. The RNSA identified that current legislation (Act No. 81/2018) lacks specific provisions requiring immediate reporting of diving accidents to RNSA, which impeded their ability to conduct a timely and thorough investigation.
Safety action
RNSA issued two safety recommendations:
- 24-044S016-T01: Directed the Ministry of Infrastructure to implement regulations regarding the duty to report diving accidents and provide information to RNSA, consistent with Act No. 18/2013.
- 24-044S016-T02: Directed the Icelandic Sport Diving School (dive.is) to ensure that dive logbooks are maintained by dive leaders in accordance with Appendix I of Regulation 535/2001.