Douglas DC-4 accident at Gander, Newfoundland, 2 Mar 1949

Accident narrative

On March 2, 1949, at approximately 0244, a Transcontinental & Western Air Douglas DC-4 struck a power line and the ground during a night approach to Gander, Newfoundland. The aircraft, operating as Flight 924, became airborne again and completed a landing at Gander Airport. None of the 24 passengers or nine crew members were injured, though the aircraft was severely damaged.

**The flight**

Flight 924 departed LaGuardia Field, New York, at 2022 on March 1, 1949, bound for Bombay, India, with its first scheduled stop at Gander. The aircraft carried 24 passengers and a crew of nine. Captain Frank C. Saylor, in command, had 8,793 hours of piloting time, including 393 hours in DC-4 equipment.

The flight was cleared on an instrument flight plan to cruise at 7,000 feet. The prognostic weather chart furnished to the crew indicated a low pressure area south of Newfoundland, with moderate icing in the clouds, and a forecast for Gander of a 200 to 500-foot ceiling, restricted visibility, and snow.

**The approach**

The flight was routine until reaching the Gander area. At 0230, the aircraft was cleared to the Gander tower for a Ground Control Approach (GCA) straight-in approach to Runway 9. The GCA operator transmitted the 0230 weather to the flight: a 400-foot overcast, visibility of two miles, light freezing drizzle, light snow, and fog.

Fourteen miles west of the field, the flight appeared on the GCA azimuth scope and was advised to descend from four thousand to three thousand feet. Thirteen miles out, the aircraft was advised to start its final approach.

During the descent through the overcast, considerable rime ice accumulated on the windshields. The captain turned on the windshield deicer, but alcohol fumes filled the cockpit, creating a fire hazard. He turned the system off, and the windshield became covered with ice, restricting forward vision to a small opening in the upper left corner of the captain's windshield. A "clear view" window, normally opened when visibility is obscured, was kept closed due to a company restriction based on a Civil Aeronautics Administration directive regarding carbon monoxide hazards.

The flight established visual contact approximately 400 feet above the ground, two miles from the airport. At this point, the landing gear was lowered and flaps were set to fifteen degrees. The aircraft then dipped below the GCA glide path. When one mile out, GCA observed the aircraft was 88 feet low. About one-half mile from the runway, the captain was advised he was 40 feet low and needed a slight right correction. A moment later, he was advised he was 20 feet low. Shortly after, the aircraft shuddered as if approaching a stall, and the airspeed indicator showed 110 miles per hour.

Approximately 1,615 feet from the approach end of Runway 9, the aircraft's nose wheel struck a power line that crossed below the GCA glide path. The aircraft then struck and sheared the tops of small trees for one hundred and fifty feet. The right wing tip contacted the snow-covered ground, and the right main landing gear plowed a wide furrow ninety-eight feet long in the snow. The aircraft became fully airborne again thirteen hundred and twenty-two feet from the end of the runway and continued to the airport for a safe landing.

**What the investigation found**

Investigators found that the windshield deicer system failed because the rubber seal and sealing compound had deteriorated, allowing alcohol to leak into the cockpit. Aside from the deicing system, the Board found no evidence of malfunctioning in the aircraft, engines, or instruments prior to the accident. The GCA equipment was also inspected and found to be in proper alignment.

The Board noted that after establishing visual contact beneath the overcast, the captain did not look at his altimeter, relying entirely on visual reference to the ground and on GCA instructions for altitude changes. The Board stated this was not standard piloting technique, as the use of either method alone requires undivided attention. Furthermore, approved GCA procedure required the pilot to proceed by visual reference upon reaching authorized minimums, or to execute a missed approach if unable to maintain visual reference. The Board also noted that lowering the gear and flaps close in on the approach, approximately two miles out, may have caused the erratic glide path.

**Probable cause**

The Civil Aeronautics Board determined that "the probable cause of this accident was the attempt to continue an approach for a landing using both GCA and visual reference to the ground under conditions of restricted cockpit visibility which resulted in the aircraft striking the ground."