Accident at Chicago, Illinois, 18 Dec 1949

Accident narrative

On December 18, 1949, at 0817, Transcontinental & Western Air Flight 154, a Lockheed Constellation, failed to stop during a landing on Runway 13R at Chicago Municipal Airport. The aircraft overran the runway, crashed through the airport boundary fence, and came to rest in an adjacent street. The aircraft was extensively damaged. One passenger was slightly injured; the other 25 passengers and the five crew members were not injured.

### The flight

Flight 154 departed San Francisco, California, on an instrument flight plan for New York, New York, with a scheduled stop in Chicago. The crew consisted of Captain S. M. Kasper, First Officer H. C. Shively, Flight Engineer D. G. Grimes, and Hostesses L. Mond and J. Tutt. The captain had 11,558 flying hours, and the first officer had 4,897. The aircraft's weight and center of gravity were within allowable limits.

Weather encountered en route was virtually as forecast, except that icing conditions over Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming prompted an altitude increase to 19,000 feet. Nearing Chicago, Air Route Traffic Control instructed the flight to hold west of the Aurora Intersection due to an estimated two-hour traffic delay. The captain requested and received clearance to divert to Omaha, Nebraska, and the company subsequently revised this to Kansas City, Missouri.

While en route to Kansas City, a company dispatcher informed the flight that an immediate approach clearance could be obtained if they returned to Chicago. The flight returned and was cleared for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 13R. Chicago weather was reported as a 300-foot ceiling and 1-1/2 miles visibility with moderate fog and smoke, and a west-southwest wind at 8 miles per hour. The aircraft had an estimated 2,100 gallons of gasoline aboard when it first arrived in the Chicago area.

### The accident sequence

The captain abandoned the first ILS approach because the aircraft was too far to the right of the localizer course. A second approach was properly aligned with the glide path and course, and was monitored by a Ground Control Operator on GCA radar.

Ground observers testified that the approach speed was faster than normal. As the aircraft flared, it remained airborne for a considerable distance before touching down approximately 3,200 feet from the approach end of the 5,730-foot runway, leaving 2,530 feet of usable runway.

The aircraft landed in a nose-high attitude on its main gear. The crew immediately pushed the nose down and applied the brakes, a company procedure recommended for slippery runways. The crew stated that brake pressure felt normal but that there was little or no braking action.

When the aircraft was approximately 450 feet from the end of the runway, the captain applied power to engines three and four and applied the left brakes, attempting to ground loop to the left to avoid an ILS transmitter building. The aircraft swerved enough to miss the building, but the application of power increased its speed. It traveled 875 feet beyond the runway, crossed a parking lot, and struck a billboard and a stone pillar before stopping in Cicero Avenue. When it became apparent the aircraft could not stop, the copilot attempted to retract the landing gear, leaving the cockpit control handle in the "up" position.

### What the investigation found

The aircraft sustained extensive damage to its fuselage, left wing, and the two left engine nacelles. The landing gear remained extended and locked, though the left main gear was forced rearward.

Investigators found that the macadam runway was wet from overnight rain, but there was no standing water. Tire marks were visible on the runway for 1,000 feet from the southeast end, with evidence that the tires skidded for the last 500 feet. All main gear tires showed skid wear, and the left inboard tire had a hole burned through by skidding. Tests of the brakes, flight instruments, flap control mechanism, and ILS radio apparatus showed they functioned normally. The aircraft was not equipped with reversible pitch propellers or a steerable nose wheel.

The crew stated that the flaps were set 80 percent down during the approach and fully lowered immediately after establishing visual contact with the ground. However, a passenger stated that the flaps were not fully extended until after the aircraft was on the ground. The Board noted that if the passenger was correct, the approach speed would have been faster than normal, which could account for the aircraft remaining airborne for a considerable distance. The crew stated their indicated airspeed was between 135 and 145 miles per hour during the ILS approach and seemed normal after visual contact.

The Board found that the coefficient of friction for rubber tires on wet runways is very low at high speeds. The Board noted that because the captain knew the runway was wet, he should have used greater precaution during his approach to ensure the landing was made with sufficient runway remaining. The Board also noted that the unfavorable wind direction possibly increased the aircraft's ground speed.

### Probable cause

The Civil Aeronautics Board determined that "the probable cause of this accident was the execution by the pilot of a final approach at an excessive air speed and a landing too far down the runway."