No fatalities

2011-10-12: Socata TBM-700 (N37SV) — Socata — Hollywood, United States of America

Hollywood, United States of AmericaLanding (descent or approach)

On October 12, 2011, a Socata TBM-700 (registration N37SV) operated by Socata was involved in an aviation accident near Hollywood, United States of America during landing or approach. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot’s failure to terminate the flight after observing multiple conflicting errors associated with the inaccurate right fuel quantity indication. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 10 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781195222Data APIEditorial standards

During a maintenance test flight near Hollywood, Florida, the aircraft experienced a total loss of engine power and executed a forced landing on a highway. The two crew members sustained minor injuries; no ground injuries were reported.

Accident Summary

Aircraft registered to SV Leasing Company of Florida and operated by SOCATA North America, Inc. sustained substantial damage during a forced landing on a highway near Hollywood, Florida. The accident followed a total loss of engine power. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 maintenance test flight from North Perry Airport (HWO), Hollywood, Florida. The airline transport pilot and a pilot-rated other crew member sustained minor injuries; there were no injuries on the ground.

Pre-Flight and Flight History

The flight originated from HWO about 1216 for a maintenance test flight following a 600-hour and annual inspection. According to the right front seat occupant, before the flight he checked the fuel load by applying electrical power and noted the G1000 indicated the left fuel tank had approximately 36 gallons while the right fuel tank had approximately 108 gallons. To balance the fuel load, he added 72.4 gallons of fuel to the left tank. At the start of the data recorded by the G1000 for the accident flight, the recorded capacity was approximately 105 gallons in the left tank and 108 gallons in the right tank.

The pilot-in-command (PIC) reported that due to the fuel load on board, he could not visually check the fuel levels; cockpit indications showed left tank approximately 105 gallons and right tank approximately 108 gallons. The PIC could not recall the fuel selector position beneath the thrust lever quadrant but stated the overhead fuel selector switch was in "auto" position.

After takeoff, the flight climbed to flight level (FL) 280 and leveled off about 20 minutes after takeoff. At that altitude, they received a "Fuel Low R" amber warning CAS message on the G1000. The PIC checked the right fuel gauge, which indicated 98 gallons, and confirmed the fuel selector automatically switched to the left tank. After about 10 seconds, the warning went out. The PIC attributed this to a sensor failure or malfunction and instructed the mechanic to note it for replacement after the flight.

Later, they received a "Fuel Unbalance" amber CAS message; the right tank had more fuel, so the PIC switched the fuel selector to supply fuel from the right tank. The flight remained at FL280 for about 8 minutes before initiating a quick descent to 10,000 feet mean sea level (msl), during which they accelerated to Vmo to test the aural warning horn.

After maintaining 10,000 feet msl for about 15 minutes, they received another "Fuel Low R" amber CAS message. The right gauge indicated 92 gallons, and the fuel selector auto-switched to the left tank; the warning extinguished after 10 seconds. Either just before or during descent to 4,000 feet, a "Fuel Unbalance" CAS message appeared. Since the right gauge indicated the right tank as fullest, the PIC switched the fuel selector to supply fuel from the right tank.

The flight proceeded to Opa-Locka Executive Airport, where they executed an ILS approach terminating with a low approach. The PIC then canceled the IFR clearance and proceeded VFR toward HWO.

While in contact with HWO air traffic control tower, the flight was cleared to join left downwind for runway 27L. On the downwind leg, another "Fuel Unbalance" amber CAS message appeared; left gauge indicated 55 gallons, right gauge 74 gallons. Expecting to land within minutes, the PIC placed the fuel selector to manual and switched to the fullest (right) tank.

Engine Failure and Forced Landing

Established on final approach to runway 27L at HWO, with gear down, flaps set to landing, and minimum speed requested by air traffic (85 knots indicated airspeed), the flight was at 800 feet when the red warning CAS message "Fuel Press" illuminated. With the PIC's permission, the right seat occupant moved the auxiliary fuel boost pump switch from "Auto" to "On", while the PIC manually moved the fuel selector to the left tank. The PIC pushed the power lever and used the manual override, but with no change. Assured the engine had quit, he moved the condition lever to cutoff, turned the starter switch on, then moved the condition lever to "Hi-Idle" in an attempt to perform an airstart.

At 1332:42, a flight crew member advised the HWO ATCT, "just lost the engine"; the controller did not reply. The PIC looked left, noticed a clear area on part of the turnpike, banked left, and in anticipation of the forced landing, placed the power lever to idle, the condition lever to cutoff, the fuel tank selector to off, and put the electrical gang bar down to secure the electrical system. He elected to retract the landing gear to shorten the landing distance. The right front seat occupant reported the airplane was landed in a southerly direction in the northbound lanes of the Florida Turnpike. There were no ground injuries.

Probable cause

The pilot’s failure to terminate the flight after observing multiple conflicting errors associated with the inaccurate right fuel quantity indication. Contributing to the accident were the total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation from the right tank, the inadequate manufacturing of the right fuel gauge electrical harness, and failure of maintenance personnel to recognize and evaluate the reason for the changing fuel level in the right fuel tank.